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ABSTRACT 
The history of Saudi-Iranian relations has been fraught. This relationship has impacted 
the United States’ role in the Persian Gulf. Prior to the formation of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran in 1979, bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran could be characterized 
in terms of mutual understanding which allowed them to become integral parts of the 
American foreign policy in the1970s. This policy was intended to safeguard Western 
interests in the Persian Gulf after the British left. Saudi-Iranian cooperation during this 
time was in stark contrast to the hostile relationship that developed between them 
following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The United States also was enveloped in its 
own hostile relationship with Iran after the revolution. The United States, thus, turned 
toward Saudi Arabia as a bulwark against Iranian aggression in the Gulf.  After the death 
of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
underwent a rapprochement. Saudi Arabia sought rapprochement despite the United 
States’ attempt to continue to isolate Iran.  At present, the relationship between Tehran 
and Riyadh is fraught as the two wrestle once again for influence, ideologically, 
logistically, and territorially. During the Obama administration, Iran was slowly 
welcomed back as a participant on the world stage as a result of the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
This development has the Saudis worried about their relationship with the United States. 
The Saudis fear that the deal will thaw the turbulent relationship between Washington 
and Tehran and in turn, Washington will abandon Riyadh for a new partner in the Gulf, 
Tehran.  
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INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE CURRENT STATE OF 
AFFAIRS 
 
From the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 until present day, 
the relationship between the Kingdom and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has been 
mercurial, which has impacted American foreign policy in the Middle East. By reviewing 
literature from a wide-range of experts who have written in English on the subject, this 
thesis will use historical analysis to look first at the early relationship between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia and the way it coalesced over various stages prior to the Iranian Revolution 
to the present day and its implications on American foreign policy in the region. 
According to Toby Craig Jones the allure of the Middle East for the US is because of its 
abundant oil supply and oil has turned the area into an American obsession, as indirect 
military involvement through arm sales to the Gulf States gave way to direct military 
intervention.1 He continued to state, “Over the course of the twentieth century, preserving 
the security not just of Saudi Arabia but of the entire Persian Gulf region and the flow of 
Middle Eastern oil were among the United States’ chief political-economic concerns.”2 
These concerns have played out differently over the course of several American 
presidents.  
Before the official establishment of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saudi Arabia had only 
limited contact. However, after the leader of Iran, sided with the Axis powers during 
World War II, the British and Russians insisted that he abdicate. It was not until Reza 
                                                 
1. Toby Craig Jones, “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,” The Journal of American History,” 
(2012): 208. doi:10.1093/jahist/jas045. 
2. Ibid. 
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Shah’s abdication in 1941 did the nature of the Saudi-Iranian relationship change. The 
two conservative monarchies became Western-aligned and, although both were Islamic 
states, Iran chose not to compete with Saudi Arabia’s important place within Islam.  
One of the defining moments in the history of their relationship was the British 
decision to vacate the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s. The British influence in the region 
was undeniable. It was as Jones stated, “a perch from which they projected power for 
several decades.”3 Since 1820, Great Britain had established a presence in the Gulf to 
protect its shipping routes and communication lines to and from the jewel of its empire, 
India, from rampant piracy in the Persian Gulf. After India received its independence 
from Britain in 1947, the Gulf continued to be important to Britain because securing 
Western access to oil was of the utmost importance.  
Britain’s departure created a power vacuum in the region. America was dismayed 
by Britain’s decision to leave, having relied on Britain to safeguard Western interests in 
the Gulf.4 However, given its overextension at that time in Vietnam, the US was not able 
to take on the role vacated by Britain. The British departure made the US anxious about 
the future of the region. Neither the British nor the Americans were eager to see a power 
vacuum emerge in the region, as they feared Soviet interference. Upon conducting 
several studies on the future of a Persian Gulf without British protection, the Nixon 
administration decided to use the two preeminent countries in the region, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, as the guardians of the Gulf to foster stability and hedge against potential 
communist influence in the area. British decolonization of the Gulf led to the forging of a 
                                                 
3. Ibid., 209. 
4. Gregory F. Gause, III, "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973." Review of 
International Studies 11, no. 04 (1985): 259, doi:10.1017/s0260210500114172. 
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new power structure in the Gulf under American tutelage.5 Jones pointed out, “Unlike its 
predecessors [the British], the United States did not wage war out of old-fashioned 
imperial calculation or ambition.”6 He continued by saying, “Keeping prices [of oil] 
stable (not low) and keeping pro-American regimes in power were central to U.S. 
strategic policy.”7 The US was not trying to create an empire; instead it wanted to foster a 
region that was sensibly conducive to its needs and concerns. 
This era of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia came to a crashing halt 
with the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Iran’s revolutionaries defined their regime against 
Saudi Arabia. Their radical ideology was opposed to Saudi conservatism and the 
Kingdom’s Western, mainly American alliance. The friction between the two states 
intensified as they fought in numerous spheres in the years that followed.  
Shortly after the revolution, Iran became mired in a protracted conflict with Iraq. 
Riyadh supported Baghdad in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, both financially and 
logistically, seeing Baghdad as a bulwark against any potential Iranian aggression. This 
support of Iran’s enemy further soured the relationship between Riyadh and Tehran. 
When the war ended and the architect of the revolution, the Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, died, Iran’s demeanor changed. It no longer wished to be isolated from the 
world because of its revolutionary politics, and wanted to reintegrate into the 
international system. With this change in outlook and a tempering of its revolutionary 
ideology, Iran slowly approached Saudi Arabia. As relations between the countries 
normalized, they entered a period of rapprochement that lasted over a decade.  
                                                 
5. Fred Halliday, "The Gulf between Two Revolutions: 1958-1979," MERIP Reports, 85 (1980): 10, 
doi:10.2307/3010801. 
6. Jones, “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,” 209-210. 
7. Ibid., 210. 
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This state of affairs remained in place until the American intervention in Iraq in 
2003. Saudi Arabia and Iran had shared a similar outlook toward Iraq prior to the 
intervention. Iran and Iraq had a long history of enmity, and the cordiality between Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq disappeared after the 1990-1991 Gulf War, when Iraq attacked Saudi 
Arabia. The American intervention reshaped the political order in the Persian Gulf. Iraq 
turned from Iranian foe to friend because once Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population came to 
power it began to elicit advice from its Shi’ite brethren in Iran. Tehran was eager to assist 
Baghdad because Iran saw a close relationship with Iraq as necessary to prevent a 
possible American incursion into Iran through Iraq. The incursion became a viable 
likelihood in the eyes of the Iranians, who saw themselves as America’s next target after 
overthrowing Saddam. 
With Iraq no longer a bulwark against Iran, Saudi Arabia began to see Iranian 
involvement in conflicts across the Middle East, rightly or wrongly. This fear was further 
realized with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. When the Arab Spring erupted in 
Syria and threatened Iran’s only Arab ally, Iran moved to defend the Syrian regime. 
Riyadh is now defining itself against Iran and is assisting Syrian opposition forces against 
the Syrian regime. This action is preventing any possible reconciliation with Iran that 
might once have been possible. Riyadh is worried about the influence Tehran has 
accumulated through its support of Syria and Iraq. Because of this influence, Riyadh 
believes it is being pushed to the side and its role in the Gulf is being minimized. Saudi 
Arabia sees its power and influence waning because of the rise of Iran.  
This belief has been reinforced by the Iran Nuclear Deal. Saudi Arabia believes 
that Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear capabilities constitute a prelude to the 
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development of nuclear weapons. With these weapons, regional power would 
permanently shift in Iran’s favor, as Tehran would use the weapons to bully other states 
to submit to its demands. Saudi Arabia also sees negotiations between the United States 
and Iran regarding Iranian nuclear capabilities as an opportunity to repair the fraught 
relationship between Washington and Tehran. Saudi Arabia felt abandoned by its old 
ally, the US. Despite the Nuclear Deal being a multipronged effort involving five other 
countries besides the US, Saudi Arabia sees America’s involvement as thawing the 
tension between Tehran and Washington.  
 However, Riyadh and Washington’s relationship is entering a new phase because 
there is a new administration in the White House. The new American president, Donald 
Trump, has only been in office for a few months and has not voiced nor enacted an Iran 
policy. Although as a candidate he voiced strong disapproval for the Nuclear Deal. He 
would “tear up” the deal because he believed it was too weak and was favorable toward 
Iran.8 Although American participation is important, it is not the sole determiner of the 
vitality of the agreement. The multilateral nature of the deal appears to prevent Trump 
from walking away from it. Although candidate Trump’s remarks regarding the Nuclear 
Deal appeared to signal a tougher stance toward Iran, President Trump has not followed 
through, but his presidency is in its infancy. As pointed out by Kenneth Katzman of the 
Congressional Research Service, “The Trump Administration has not stated a position on 
any pending legislation, nor on the overall issue of the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive 
                                                 
8. Eric B. Lorber, "President Trump and the Iran Nuclear Deal," Foreign Policy, November 11, 2016, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/president-trump-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal/; Elliot Smilowitz, "Trump: 
Iran Deal Was So Bad It's Suspicious." The Hill,  Accessed April 10, 2017, http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-
box/gop-primaries/264598-trump-iran-deal-was-so-bad-its-suspicious. 
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plan of Action, a.k.a. the Iran Nuclear Deal].”9 The nature of the relationship between 
Riyadh and Washington could be growing closer as there is congruence in their demeanor 
toward Iran. 
                                                 
9. Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report No. RS20871, 
Washington, DC, 2017, 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170414_RS20871_a6ff6e74c41408f243d8856b337fb20dcb9f7ca9.
html. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND 
SAUDI ARABIA (1932-1979) 
 
While Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud, better known as Ibn Saud, 
conquered the Arabian Peninsula from 1902 to 1932, Iran and Saudi Arabia had limited 
interactions. The key phases of their interactions dealt mainly with Iranian pilgrims 
making hajj to Mecca and with Persian merchants who accompanied them and conducted 
business along the hajj route.10 After bringing most of the Arabian Peninsula under his 
control, Ibn Saud established the Kingdom in 1932. After this point, the arrangement 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran became a relationship of mutual interests, especially 
during the rule of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970). After Nasser and 
his ideology of Pan-Arabism were neutralized, the next issue that required their joint 
attention was the British departure from the Middle East in 1971.11 With the British 
departure, the Americans and British saw the creation of a vacuum that was ripe for 
unwanted Soviet influence.12 To prevent the expansion of Soviet power, the Americans 
created a security system that would utilize the strengths of the two largest and most 
influential countries in the area, Saudi Arabia and Iran.13  
 
                                                 
10. Banafsheh Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), 9. 
11. In 1968, the British decided by 1971 that it would end its protective treaty relationships with (name 
countries) and gave them independence. It also decided to remove its military from the area.  
12. Richard Haass, "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Twin Pillars in Revolutionary Times." in The Security of 
the Persian Gulf, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 160; John P. Miglietta, 
American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2002), 56. 
13. Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?, 9.  
TEMPLATE 
 
 8 
The making of the Saudi Kingdom and the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran: The birth of 
diplomatic relations between the two states  
 
 
Saudi Arabia and Iran shared similarities when it came to nation building in an 
age when most of the Middle East was still under colonial rule.14 In 1932, after uniting 
nearly eighty percent of the Arabian Peninsula under his rule and creating the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia based on a strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, Ibn Saud assumed the 
title of king. A little earlier in 1925, Reza Shah similarly proclaimed himself king after he 
came to power by toppling the ruling Qajar Dynasty in a successful coup d’état in 1921.  
However, the two states took different stances toward Great Britain, the dominant 
colonial power in the region. The positions they chose would ultimately benefit Ibn Saud 
and hurt Reza Shah. The Shah’s antagonistic stance toward Britain would cost him his 
throne when he sided with the Axis powers during the Second World War. When the 
Allies won the war, Britain and Russia forced him to abdicate in favor of his son, 
Mohammed Reza.  
The new shah maintained relations with Saudi Arabia until 1943, when the Saudi 
government executed an Iranian pilgrim, Abu Taleb Yazdi, for supposedly throwing his 
vomit on the Ka’ba. The Iranians objected bitterly to the execution, while the Saudis 
retorted that they had the right to administer their laws as they saw fit. The result of this 
row was the severing of diplomatic ties between the two countries, a state of affairs that 
would last until 1946.   
In 1946, King Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud) wrote a letter to the Shah urging the 
resumption of diplomatic ties. The Shah agreed to the King’s proposal, and ties resumed 
                                                 
14. Adel Al-Toraifi, "Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The 
Rise of Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement (1997-2009)" (PhD diss., The London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE), 2012), 97. 
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the following year. The Saudi historian, Saeed M. Badeeb, stated, “Between 1947 and 
1950 Saudi-Iranian relations strengthened as the interests of the countries merged in two 
important areas. First, Iran decisively aligned itself with Western, particularly American, 
interests. Second, as the two countries developed their oil industries, they often dealt with 
common issues.”15 In 1953, Saudi-Iranian relations were disrupted but not severed when 
the Shah was forced to flee Iran after the Americans and British orchestrated a coup 
d’état to remove the democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed 
Mossadeqh. The Americans and British wanted Mossadeqh removed from power because 
he nationalized Iranian oil in 1951. Mossadeqh was motivated by a desire to end foreign 
economic domination of Iran. This move infuriated the British who had had a large stake 
in Iranian oil since 1901. The Shah fled Iran, briefly, as he was complicit in the coup. It 
was upon his orders that Mossadeqh was to be removed from office and replaced with a 
prime minister amenable to both the Americans and the British. After the failed coup, 
Mossadeqh, as the new leader of Iran, continued diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. 
During this time, trade expanded between the two countries.16  
In 1953, the British and Americans staged another coup through a clandestine 
campaign, this time successfully overthrowing Mossadeqh. At the same time in 1953, 
King Abd al-Aziz died and his eldest son, Saud, became king. According to Badeeb, 
these dual changes of leadership ushered in a new era for the Iranians and the Saudis: 
“The Saudi-Iranian political relations began to evolve around three major issues: regional 
politics, oil and international security.”17 
                                                 
15. Saeed M. Badeeb, Saudi-Iranian Relations: 1932-1982 (London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies, 
1993), 51. 
16. Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?, 62.  
17.Ibid, 52. 
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The threat of Pan-Arabism to Saudi Arabia and Iran 
Pan-Arabism was a secular Arab nationalist philosophy, which sought to unite all 
Arabs. Its greatest champion was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Among the 
elites in Saudi Arabia, there was an Arab nationalist movement supported by Nasser. The 
Arab National Liberation Front and the Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula 
sought the establishment of a republic in Saudi Arabia. These opposition groups had little 
support inside Saudi Arabia and thus were of little concern to the monarchy.18 However, 
there was conflict inside the monarchy regarding how to deal with Nasser and his anti-
royalist stance. The King saw nationalism and socialism as a threat and a partial reason 
for the Shah’s loss of power in 1953.19 
 At first, King Saud sought to placate Nasser. For instance, the King supported 
Egypt during the Suez Crisis, when Israel, Great Britain, and France invaded Egypt to 
regain control of the canal after Nasser nationalized it. Riyadh severed diplomatic 
relations with France and Britain during the crisis, and discontinued oil exports to the two 
states. The King believed that by placating Nasser he could rein in Nasser’s ambitions.20 
However, as Nasser’s popularity grew, so did dissent within the Kingdom. Labor unrests 
broke out in Saudi Arabia and were linked to Pro-Nasserist factions active within the 
Kingdom. The relationship between Riyadh and Cairo quickly soured after Nasser’s Pan-
Arabism turned anti-royalist as he supported the socialist element within the Saudi army, 
                                                 
18. Ibid., 104. 
19. Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?, 62.  
20. Ibid., 73. 
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which attempted to overthrow the Saudi monarchy in 1955.21 As a result, King Saud 
began to openly challenge Nasser and his ideology. 22  
The turning point in the Egyptian and Saudi relationship came in 1961, when 
Nasser accused conservative regimes such as Saudi Arabia of financing the collapse of 
the United Arab Republic (UAR), the political union between Syria and Egypt, in 
existence from 1958–1961.23 The collapse of the UAR prompted the 1962 Egyptian 
intervention in the coup in North Yemen because the breakup of the UAR was a major 
defeat and humiliation for Nasser and his Pan-Arabism. Fawaz A. Gerges pointed out, 
“The breakup of the UAR revealed deep fissures within Arab societies and exposed their 
heterogeneity and factionalism. The breakup also revealed the bankruptcy of ideology in 
Arab politics and the predominance of national interests.”24 Furthermore, Gerges believed 
that Egypt needed to keep the revolution of Pan-Arabism alive and thus exported it to 
Yemen. By doing this, Nasser retained the possibility of regaining the prestige he had lost 
in the Arab world with the dissolution of the UAR. This loss of prestige was significant, 
as it affected Nasser’s presumptive role as the leader of Pan-Arabism, and as a leader in 
the Arab world. The coup in Yemen also gave Nasser the ability to show off Egypt’s 
military prowess and retaliate against the pro-Western conservative Arab nations that he 
blamed for the UAR’s downfall.25 Involvement in the Yemeni Civil War also advanced 
the fading Arab nationalist cause. The downfall of Arab nationalism, Gerges notes, was 
not only an international problem but a domestic one as well.  
                                                 
21. Ibid., 69. 
22. Al-Toraifi, 104. 
23. Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-opting 
Arab Nationalism," The Middle East Journal (1995): 298. 
24. Ibid., 295. 
25. Ibid., 299. 
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 He [Nasser] felt compelled to act decisively to escape entrapment and 
marginalization. His response was to plunge Egypt deeper into socialism 
domestically and to project Egyptian power in the Arabian peninsula (sic) by 
intervening militarily on the side of the republican elements in Yemen. Nasser's 
larger objective was to seize the initiative in the Arab arena by striking back at the 
pro-Western, Arab conservative forces as represented by Saudi Arabia.26  
In response to Nasser’s provocation in Yemen, the Saudis aided the dethroned Yemeni 
Imam, Muhammad al-Badr, in regaining his power by providing military assistance and 
refusing to recognize the new Egyptian-backed government in Yemen.27 The Saudis 
aided the Yemeni ruler because they saw their neighbor as integral to their own national 
security.  
Saudi Arabia, because of the conflict in Yemen, also looked more toward its allies 
for support, including Iran. As a result, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
grew stronger because the Shah also feared the potential threat of Arab Nationalism. Both 
nations also feared a Soviet presence in the Gulf through its Egyptian proxy. This 
potential Soviet presence in the Gulf, combined with the thousand-mile border that Iran 
shared with the Soviets, made Iran feel as if it was being encircled by the Soviets.28 
Tehran and Moscow did not have a cordial relationship at that time because Russia, 
during the Qajar reign, had seized territory in northern Persia. This historical seizure of 
land made Iran wary of any Soviet incursions into the Gulf. 
Egypt’s involvement in Yemen turned out to be the beginning of Nasser’s 
downfall, not his redemption. The involvement took a massive toll on the Egyptian 
economy and military.29 The cost was magnified by the massive loss inflicted on Egypt 
during its 1967 war with Israel. Shortly thereafter, Nasser removed his troops from 
                                                 
26. Ibid., 309. 
27. Al-Toraifi, 104. 
28. Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?, 73.  
29. Ibid., 309. 
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Yemen, reducing the threat to Saudi Arabia and the potential encirclement of Iran. As 
Nasser’s prestige and influence began to wane, Saudi and Iranian interests shifted. By 
1968, although the issue of Yemen had not receded, new issues began to take precedence, 
including the British decision to withdraw its forces from the Gulf. 
 
The Nixon Doctrine and the Twin Pillars  
With the British decision to retract its empire and to withdraw its political as well 
as military means from the Gulf, American President Richard Nixon commissioned a 
study to determine the US response to the British withdrawal and the best course of 
action for the US to take. According to James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, at a hearing in front of the 
House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia in 1973, “A major conclusion of 
that study, and a number of follow-on studies, was that the United States would not 
assume the former British role of protector in the Gulf area, but that primary 
responsibility for peace and stability should henceforth fall on the states of the region.”30 
The Nixon administration decided on a policy that would not have the US engaged in 
protecting the Gulf, a role the administration believed should be fulfilled by the Gulf 
States themselves. The Gulf States likewise believed that they should take on this 
responsibility without relying on an outside presence. The Nixon administration also did 
not want to be responsible for the protection of the Gulf because, as John P. Miglietta 
explained, requiring the countries in the Middle East to be responsible for their own 
                                                 
30. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs – New Perspectives on the 
Persian Gulf: Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 
June 6, July 17, 23, 24, and November 28, 1973. 
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security “was more efficient and cost effective for the United States.”31 The US was still 
involved in a costly war in Vietnam and did not have the resources to divert its attention 
away from Asia. Furthermore, Miglietta interpreted this course of action of having the 
Gulf States assume responsibility for their own security as an “ultimate strategic goal.” 
He posited, “The ultimate strategic goal of the United States was to reduce its 
conventional military forces and the defense budget in general.”32 He saw the Nixon 
Doctrine as reducing the American defense budget and troop presence in the region, 
which were overextended by Vietnam, while maintaining Western interests in the Gulf.33 
Faisal bin Salman al-Saud pointed out that the Gulf was important for three reasons: “the 
possibility of Soviet insurgence after British withdrawal; its linkage to the security of the 
Middle East as a whole in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the question of 
access to oil.”34 Noyes continued to explain that the plan was to rely on Saudi Arabia and 
Iran to maintain the status quo in the Gulf: 
In the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, we are willing to assist the Gulf states (sic) but 
we look to them to bear the main responsibility for their own defense and to 
cooperate among themselves to insure regional peace and stability. We especially 
look to the leading states of the area, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to cooperate for this 
purpose.35 
 Noyes extrapolated these remarks from Nixon’s 1969 speech in Guam, where Nixon 
said, “But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy that will 
make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as 
the one that we have in Vietnam.”36 Therefore it was important for the US to empower 
                                                 
31. Miglietta, 298. 
32. Ibid., 299. 
33. Ibid.. 
34. Al-Saud, 65. 
35. U.S. Congress, Statement of James H. Noyes, 39. 
36. Richard Nixon, "Richard Nixon: Informal Remarks in Guam," The American Presidency Project, 
Accessed July 13, 2016. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140. 
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the largest and most prominent countries in the Gulf, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, to 
assume the role of protector. Jones pointed out that “the Nixon Doctrine called upon 
American allies to bear a greater burden in providing for their own defense…Without the 
British present to preserve the Gulf’s balance of power, the United States moved to build 
up local militaries to maintain regional order.”37 The US believed that the act of assuming 
the role the British had vacated would hobble rather than empower the Gulf States. 
The US chose Tehran and Riyadh because they were the two largest and most 
influential states in the Gulf and because both had harmonious relationships with the 
United States. However, with Saudi Arabia’s paltry military, nonexistent navy, and small 
air force, as compared to Iran’s overall military prowess, an unequal burden would be 
placed on Iran.38 According to Miglietta, both Saudi Arabia and Iran were important to 
the US, therefore the US could not rely solely on one of them to protect the Gulf security. 
Doing so could damage its relationship with the other country; thus, regional stability was 
seen as achievable only with a partnership between the two states.39 The US did not see 
the partnership as a purely military joint venture, but rather as a collaboration between 
Iran’s military prowess and Saudi Arabia’s financial wealth and prominent place within 
Islam. Riyadh’s money, plus its credibility in the Arab world, would be used as a 
mediating force and a bulwark against Nasserism and any Soviet influence. Iran, with its 
military superiority, would fulfill the defense role vacated by Britain.40 Both countries 
would be defenders of the status quo in the Middle East, each with roles to play. Richard 
Haass explained that this balancing act was strengthened by the fact that each country 
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“complemented” the other. At the same time, the strength of the two states tended to 
complement rather than compete, Iran for all its military might, was never able to 
challenge Saudi legitimacy and leadership among Arab states, while Saudi Arabia, for all 
its economic and political influence, lacked the ultimate arbiter of military power.”41 
Although Saudi Arabia, after the Nixon Doctrine, became the second largest purchaser of 
American weaponry (after Iran), Riyadh, unlike Iran, was unable to absorb all of the 
technology that it acquired. This obstacle resulted from “internal dynamics” within Saudi 
Arabia. However, Miglietta never explained in detail what these dynamics were.42 A 
possible interpretation of Miglietta’s “internal dynamics” could be Saudi Arabia’s 
smaller, less educated population.  
Saudi Arabia was wary at first about assuming such a prominent role in the Gulf. 
Iran, on the other hand, did not have the same fears. Rather, Iran saw this as a chance to 
enhance its standing in the Middle East, as well as to increase its military capabilities. 
The US, meanwhile, saw Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to Iran’s ambition. Left 
unchecked, this ambition could have gone awry, especially if the policy relied solely on 
Tehran to maintain the status quo. Abdel al-Toraifi explained the Saudi fears, “At first, 
the Saudis were reluctant to play the role, fearing that Nasser and other radical Arab 
states would exploit the Saudi-US alliance to prove that they were traitors to the Arab 
cause…[but] the Saudis took advantage of Nixon’s policy to enhance their standing in the 
region.”43 Although they had been wary in the beginning, the Saudis adapted to their new 
role wholeheartedly. According to Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp: 
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From the British departure from the Persian Gulf in December 1971 until the 
revolution in Iran in February 1979, Iran and Saudi Arabia managed their mutual 
relations without incident…the two pro-Western monarchs coordinated their 
policies in the face of the mutually sensed threat from Abdul (sic) Nasser’s Egypt 
to the Arabian peninsula (sic) and Persian Gulf.44  
Haass, writing immediately after the Iranian Revolution, acknowledged that peace in the 
region was maintained due to cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He stated: 
Any explanation of the source of this stability must in large part reflect Irani-
Saudi co-operation, which in turn resulted from a basic coincidence of regional 
aims. Whatever anxiety Saudi leaders felt about Iran’s ambitions and strength was 
allayed by the recognition that the two states shared many sources of security. 
Both opposed a major Soviet role in the region, and both were wary of any signs 
of radicalism regardless of the source. Armed conflict in the region was to be 
avoided if possible, and oil production and sea lanes protected against interference 
or interruption.45  
Haass furthers this point by saying “a large degree of informal and tacit co-operation 
existed between Iran and Saudi Arabia, reflecting a similarity in aims and a 
complementarity of means.”46 Despite Saudi Arabia’s initial fears of working with the 
US and Iran, the British withdrawal ushered in almost a decade of stability in the region, 
which was marked by Iran and Saudi Arabia working together to maintain peace. 
The one hiccup in their relationship during this rather cordial time was the 1973 
Yom Kippur War, which precipitated the Arab oil embargo. The oil-producing Arab 
states of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) imposed an 
embargo on the Western nations that had supported Israel during the war.47 Jones said, 
“Gulf oil producers were infuriated when the United States helped re-equip the 
beleaguered Israeli military in the course of battle. Led by Saudi Arabia, Arab oil 
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producers and oil companies orchestrated an embargo of the United Stated thereby drying 
up supply and driving up prices.”48 Iran did not join the embargo, because it could not 
afford to lose oil revenue. It took advantage of the increased global oil price, and 
continued to supply the United States.49 Haass explained, “Iran, dependent upon a 
continuous source of income to meet domestic demands, was unwilling to interrupt 
sales.”50 The Saudis, however, had a greater oil reserve than did Iran, and thus were 
capable of withstanding periods of reduced or even nonexistent production.  
In spite of working toward different goals, the oil embargo did not strain the 
relationship between Riyadh and Tehran and they were able to continue to work together 
as the twin pillars. The period of 1968-1979 was probably the most peaceful, stable and 
genial time in their bilateral relationship. 
 
Conclusion 
 The early years of Iranian-Saudi relations can be characterized as turbulent but 
affable, with diplomatic ties severed and restored numerous times resulting from clashes 
over multiple issues. Nevertheless, Iran and Saudi Arabia came together as Western-
aligned states against the Arab nationalists and the potential Soviet threat which 
endangered their regimes as well as Western interests. They successfully maintained this 
relationship until the time of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when Iran redefined itself as 
anti-Western and anti-royalist. Jones aptly pointed out, “The fall of the shah, considered 
unthinkable by American officials just a few years before, demolished the twin-pillar 
                                                 
48. Jones, “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,”211. 
49. Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of 
Power in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 140. 
50. Haass, 156. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 19 
policy.”51 This redefinition would set Iran against the Western-aligned Saudi monarchy 
and upturned the relationship between Iran and the US.  Jones discussed the impact the 
revolution had on American foreign policy. He stated: 
From the perspective of American policy makers, the revolution radically 
transformed the balance of power in the region, turning Iran from America’s 
strategic ally to a menacing rival. Whatever the reality of Iran’s new position in 
the region the revolution brought to a dramatic conclusion U.S. reliance on highly 
militarized local powers as defenders of the Gulf’s regional order. While they 
would continue to encourage and oversee the militarization of Saudi Arabia and 
other Arab oil producers in the 1980s and beyond, American leaders lost faith in 
the idea that local surrogates possessed the political capacity to safeguard U.S. 
interests.52 
Furthermore, the American hostage crisis and by extension the revolution along with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 were key factors that changed the course of 
American foreign policy in the region making the foreign policy more interventionist.53  
Despite its new outlook toward its role in the Middle East, the US continued to militarize 
the Gulf States only aggravated current uncertainties in regards to power grabs by despots 
and hurdled the region into an era of endless wars.54  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE REDEFINITION OF IRANIAN-
SAUDI RELATIONS (1979-1989) 
 
In 1979, a fundamental shift occurred in the relationship between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran and Iran and the US. The rupture was not sudden, but slow. The Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 has been characterized as one of the most significant revolutions in 
history, as it was able to sweep away the old regime and replace it with an entirely 
different system. The revolutionaries considered their cause to have universal appeal, and 
revolution was to sweep through the Muslim world starting with Iran’s backyard and its 
Arab Gulf neighbors. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran’s revolution, 
believed that Muslims are naturally inclined toward Islamic governance. It was his view 
the Islamic principles, which were the basis of Iran’s new government, would appeal to 
the citizens of these countries. They naturally would gravitate toward Iran’s new 
government and replicate it in their respective countries.  
Banafsheh Keynoush noted that Iran saw the Gulf States, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, as an obstacle to propagation of revolution in its neighbors because Tehran was 
now competing with Riyadh for the leadership position of the global Muslim community. 
She stated, “Naturally, after the revolution, Tehran viewed the Arab States as its main 
rival in its drive to attain leadership in the Islamic world. From the outset, Iran’s goal to 
export its brand of Shi’ite revolutionary Islam collided with the Saudi claim over 
leadership of the Islamic world.”55 Saudi Arabia became the undisputed leader by having 
                                                 
55. Azra Banafsheh Keynoush, The Iranian-Saudi Arabian Relationship: From Ideological Confrontation 
to Pragmatic Accommodation (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: Tufts University, 2007), 84. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 21 
the two holiest sites within Islam, Mecca and Medina, and its claim to be a state built on a 
pure form of Sunni Islam. Both the Saudi and Iranian regimes used Islam to legitimize 
their rule at home and give them credibility abroad. Thus, the two states, given their 
ideological differences, clashed.  
According to the French political scientist Gilles Kepel, “The Muslim world as 
such had been under Saudi religious domination since the creation of the Islamic 
conference in 1969 and the triumph of petro-Islam war of October 1973.”56 These two 
factors, along with Mecca and Medina, cemented Saudi Arabia as the most important and 
influential leader in the Muslim world. The embargo showed the world that Riyadh was 
not beholden to the West and the establishment of the Islamic conference helped to foster 
Muslim solidarity. The domination of Saudi Arabia of the global Muslim community 
continued unabated until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Kepel continued:  
But after 1979 the new masters in Iran considered themselves the true standard-
bearers of Islam, despite their minority status as Shiites. As far as they were 
concerned, the leaders in Riyadh were usurpers who sold oil to the West in 
exchange for military protection—a retrograde, conservative monarchy with a 
façade of ostentatious piety.57  
Iran’s method of disseminating its message was through propaganda directed to and 
tailored for the Muslim community. Kepel pointed out the Iranian propaganda “incited 
them [Muslims] to rise up against the impiety of their leaders.”58 Furthermore, “Iran’s 
strategy sought to replace the supremacy of the Saudis throughout the Community of the 
Faithful with that of Khomeini. It took care to play down Shiism, since more than 80 
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percent of all Muslims were Sunni.”59 Although the Shi’ite elements of the revolution 
were downplayed by the Iranians, the Saudis emphasized the Shi’ite nature of the Iranian 
revolution to dissuade the Sunni minority from adopting revolution.60 Furthermore, the 
Saudis threw vast sums of money at the problem by financing the expansion of their form 
of Islam throughout the world.61  
Saudi Arabia reacted to the changes in Iran by first attempting to placate the new 
Iranian government and power structure. The al-Saud family said it welcomed the change 
in leadership because now Tehran and Riyadh had Islamic principle-based government in 
common. The differences in their versions of Islam, Sunni and Shi’a, did not divide them; 
the principles of Islam, in general, united them. Furthermore, the Saudis viewed Iran’s 
new theocratic regime as a refreshing change after the secular machinations of the Shah. 
The Kingdom and the Islamic Republic were now united in their goals, at least so the 
Saudis believed.  
Khomeini discarded the notion of a future united by commonalities. Iran’s new 
leader wanted Iran to be the leading example of Islamic virtue, and throughout his tenure 
he challenged Saudi Arabia and its ruling family about its level of commitment to Islam, 
calling Saudi Wahhabism “American Islam” or “false Islam.” Before assuming the role 
of Supreme Leader, Iran’s highest-ranking political and religious post, Khomeini had not 
shied away from voicing his views regarding the form of government in Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, it should not have come as a surprise to the Saudis that Khomeini’s regime would 
be antagonistic toward them. Much of the enmity stemmed from a struggle to redefine the 
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dynamics of the Persian Gulf, according to Adel al-Toraifi.62 The change in relations 
between the countries only ameliorated after Khomeini’s death in 1989, when much of 
the rhetoric espoused by him was, although not disavowed, at least compartmentalized as 
being part of Iran’s past. Iran gave priority to a new path of reintegration into the world, 
politically and economically. However, the revolution and ensuing Iran-Iraq War 
awakened anxieties in the Gulf States and the US to Iran’s ambitions. Jones emphasized 
that these anxieties created “Iran’s status as one of the region’s principal bogeymen and 
‘rogue’ states [which] has endured and continues today to be one of the primary and 
repeated justifications for a continued American military presence in the region.”63 
 
The transformation of Iran into the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) 
The Islamic Revolution began in earnest in 1977 after the wayward liberalization 
programs that the Shah began in 1963, better known as the “White Revolution,” failed to 
grow Iran politically or economically. These liberalization efforts did, however, lead to 
an outpouring of opposition against the Shah’s rule. The White Revolution, as described 
by Andrew Scott Cooper, was “an ambitious program of social and economic reforms to 
transform Iran from a semifeudal (sic) baron state into a modern industrial power.”64 The 
Shah used the influx of income from oil to fund his ambitious plan, but as oil prices 
declined, the Shah’s spending became unsustainable. The Shah had high expectations for 
his plan, but the changes enacted were dismissed as superficial and effectively alienated 
several different strata of Iranian society. The liberalization was meant to cement middle, 
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as well as working, class support for the Shah and, in turn, strengthen the monarchy by 
elevating these groups economically and enfranchising them with political reform.  
However, the reform impacted the economy negatively and as the economy 
declined, interest in religion increased. The Shah’s programs became associated with 
opulence, inequality, and repression, the opposite of their intended purpose. People from 
all segments of society flocked to religion to soothe their uneasiness. Those involved in 
the religious revival came together with the secular segments of Iranian society over their 
shared hatred for the Shah and his policies. The silent majority the Shah thought he was 
empowering, mainly the middle class, was disturbed by the unrest and abandoned him by 
leaving Iran in droves.  
As Iranians flocked to religion, Khomeini became the symbol under which 
disparate sections of Iranian society congealed into a unified voice. Moshen M. Milani 
stated, “Shi’ism became the umbrella under which different groups came together and 
destabilized the government.”65 Moreover, the Israeli victory in the 1967 war likewise 
served as a catalyst for this disillusionment according to Cooper:  
For many Muslims, Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War shattered the belief 
that Western idea held the key to a prosperous and just future. With the old 
panaceas—nationalism, socialism, and secularism—identified with failure and 
humiliation, their search for solutions led many young Muslims, Sunni and Shia 
alike, back to the mosque and the old ways. 66  
David Menashri echoed Cooper’s point about the role of Islam in pre-revolution Iran and 
stated, “Indeed, Iranians rose against the Shah for a variety of reasons, but viewed Islam 
as the panacea to end the social and economic crisis, to provide their children with a 
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better life and to lead their country to a brighter future.”67 Islam gave the revolution its 
basis and appealed to various strata who felt disillusionment and despair. Religion was 
seen as the solution to all the ills facing Iran, such as “economic distress, social 
disparities, political repression, foreign exploitation and the unsettling consequences of 
rapid Westernization and modernization.”68 
Cooper further described the summer of 1977 as a cacophony of discontent, as the 
religious revival and leftist alienation coalesced around Khomeini. Students and 
intellectuals rallied together to support Khomeini, not because they shared his values, but 
because he was a charismatic figure and because of his anti-Western stance. Khomeini’s 
appeal to religion brought different segments of society together under a relatable shared 
identity. According to Menashri, “His [Khomeini’s] dogma, thus, became in the eyes of 
many revolutionaries the hope for salvation and a brighter future.”69  
The Shah’s reaction to dissent was to increase liberalization and not suppress the 
protesters, and most importantly not to quash unrest with a massive violent response. He 
saw such an action as having negative consequences for Iran’s future and the future of the 
crown. He had worked hard to improve Iran’s human rights record (a course of action the 
Carter administration had encouraged) and believed that large-scale violence would be 
counterproductive. It would tarnish Iran’s reputation in the eyes of foreign powers, which 
Iran needed for its geopolitical as well as financial security. He saw the unrest as 
necessary, a byproduct of progress. However, his plan for further liberalization to 
transform Iran from an authoritarian regime into a democracy signaled weakness in the 
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eyes of his opponents as well as his proponents.70 By 1979, supporters of the monarchy 
were leaving Iran and being replaced by an influx of anti-royalists. 
The chaos that erupted quickly turned into on environment inhospitable for the 
Shah to continue his rule. Under pressure from his main supporter, the United States, he 
left Iran, never to return. The same Western governments that insisted he reduce Iran’s 
human rights violations were dismayed when he did not use violence to repress the 
unrest. His departure paved the way for the return of Khomeini after 15 years in exile.  
Khomeini returned and seized power. Royalists, along with his nonreligious 
supporters including leftists, Communists, and anarchists, were all seen as threats to him 
and his theocracy and were summarily executed. According to Ervand Abrahamian, “In 
the twenty-eight months between February 1979 and June 1981, revolutionary courts 
executed 497 political opponents as ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘sowers (sic) of 
corruption on the earth.’”71 As this purge was occurring, Khomeini went straight to work 
producing a referendum for the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). After 
the April 1979 referendum that abolished the monarchy and brought him to power, 
Khomeini proposed the establishment of a government based on his ideas of the rule of 
the jurisprudent, velayat-e-faqih. A popularly supported vote on the new constitution in 
December 1979 created a state like the one espoused by Khomeini in his treatise, Islamic 
Government. 
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Saudi Arabia reacts to the establishment of the IRI 
Saudi Arabia responded to the change in Iran’s government with tempered 
optimism and a little naiveté. In an interview al-Toraifi conducted with Prince Turki al-
Faisal, the head of Saudi intelligence at the time of the revolution, the latter stated that the 
Saudis did not believe Khomeini would not govern, but instead would serve as a religious 
advisor. The Saudis inherited this belief from the Americans who did not believe that the 
religious establishment could or would involve themselves in the daily running of a 
state.72 The Saudis also did not see him as inimical to them. They knew from Khomeini’s 
pamphlets and cassettes that he opposed the Shah, but did not extrapolate that his 
antagonism toward monarchy extended to all monarchies.73 This point supported the idea 
of Saudi naiveté, as Khomeini had never been shy about his thoughts on monarchical 
government, saying several times that monarchy was in direct conflict with Islam. 
Although mostly speaking about the Shah, the universal principles Khomeini espoused 
applied to other monarchies as well. In a speech he gave in Najaf, Iraq in October 1971, 
Khomeini discussed Islam’s incompatibility with monarchy.74 He was explicitly talking 
about the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran as he denigrated Iran’s celebration of the 2,500th year 
anniversary of the institution of monarchy in Iran. However, in Islamic Government, 
Khomeini referred to monarchy as generally inconsistent with Islam, asserting that “Islam 
proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid.”75 Instead, the Saudis 
saw themselves as the exact opposites of the Shah. They believed that the Shah’s fast-
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paced attempts at modernization were the real cause of his downfall.76 Because of this 
narrow view, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, along with Prince Abdullah, took the 
opportunity to placate the Iranian government now led by Khomeini. According to Nadav 
Safran: 
On April 2, 1979, on the occasion of Khomeini’s proclamation of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Khaled (sic) sent him a note of congratulations in which he stressed 
that Islamic solidarity could form the basis of close ties between the two countries. 
Later that month Abdallah (sic) elaborated on the potential for Saudi-Iranian 
cooperation…in which he indicated that Saudi Arabia actually preferred Iran’s new 
regime to the Shah’s.77 
 For Khomeini, the revolution was not to be limited to Iran. Rather, he saw it as a 
movement that should encompass the Muslim world. David Menashri quoted Khomeini 
as saying, “Iran was only ‘the starting point,’ Muslims ‘are one family…even if they live 
in regions remote from each other.’ Even being Shia or Sunni ‘is not the question.’”78 
Regardless of the type of government, these governments oppressed Muslims and this 
oppression was exacerbated by the Western alliances enjoyed by these governments. 
Although a message for all Muslims, his rhetoric primarily empowered the Shi’a in other 
countries. 
Despite ample evidence to the contrary stemming from Khomeini’s own words 
regarding monarchy, the Saudi ruling family did not equate themselves to the dethroned 
Shah. They saw themselves as different from the Shah, his monarchy and ruling style.  
Yet, Keynoush argued that, the similarities were obvious, “Although the Saudi regime 
had attempted to portray the Iranian revolution as a non-threat to its Islamic credentials, it 
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was impossible to overlook the analogy drawn between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”79 Several 
incidents took place before the Saudis removed their rose-colored glasses and reevaluated 
the Iran Revolution.  
 
The reverberations of the Iranian Revolution on Saudi society  
On November 26, 1979, Shi’ites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia 
attempted to hold an Ashura celebration despite a long-standing ban on such proceedings. 
Ashura is a special holiday for the Shi’a, as it marks the murder of Hussein, the grandson 
of Mohammed and the son of Ali, by the Caliph Yazid in Karbala in 680 C.E. Hussein’s 
lineage is important because the Shi’a believe that Ali was the rightful successor of the 
Prophet. Jacob Goldberg described Ashura as “the most solemn [event] in the Shi’i 
calendar.”80 The Shi’a celebrate Ashura with mass parades, reenactments, and Passion 
plays depicting Hussein’s life and death.  
Thus, that November four thousand marchers gathered to celebrate Ashura. The 
Saudi National Guard attempted to stop the celebration, prompting protests in another 
town in the Eastern Province. After a few days, demonstrations and violence erupted 
throughout the Eastern Province; dozens were killed and many more were wounded. In 
January 1980, forty days after the death of the first protestors, people marched to pay 
tribute to the dead. The National Guard was again in attendance, but there was no 
violence. These peaceful demonstrations were followed by more demonstrations marking 
the one-year anniversary of Khomeini’s return to Iran, which did turn violent as the 
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marchers clashed with security forces. As the violence escalated, one person was killed 
and several were injured. A national emergency was declared and the National Guard 
arrived to protect the local infrastructure as marchers burned buildings and vehicles. 
Unrest continued throughout the month. During the state’s crackdown on protesters, the 
authorities arrested many people and others fled Saudi Arabia. 
There are many thoughts as to what sparked the uprisings in the Eastern Province. 
Goldberg and Jones both said that the uprisings were rooted in the economic and social 
conditions of the Shi’a in the Eastern Province who had not shared in the Saudi oil wealth 
and still lived in mud hovels without modern conveniences, but events in Iran played a 
role as well. According to Goldberg, “active Shi’i resistance was sparked by the Iranian 
revolution and the propaganda emanating from Tehran.”81 He also added that the timing 
of the uprisings brought up their connection to the revolution as they occurred shortly 
afterward. He continued, “it was no coincidence that it surfaced just ten months after the 
revolution in Iran.”82 Goldberg commented that the revolution was not just influential to 
the Saudi Shi’ites but was an example as to how the Shi’ites should react against the 
ruling regime. It was not only a model, but it gave them the strength to challenge the 
government, an asset they did not have before the revolution. Goldberg commented, that 
before the revolution “the Shi’is were anxious not to alienate the Saudi regime. However, 
the revolution in nearby Shi’i Iran provided the Shi’is in Hasa [Eastern Province] with a 
sense of power and self-confidence they had previously lacked.”83 Jones added that the 
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uprisings, despite having Iranian roots, were not just a response to the call by Khomeini 
for Shi’a to rebel. Although the Shi’a in the Eastern Province admired Khomeini, they did 
not look to him as their religious authority. Rather, they looked inward to a leadership 
that wanted change. That leadership called on the local population to celebrate Ashura, 
and people responded to this call. Once the regime cracked down on the marchers and the 
National Guard responded violently, participants grew in numbers. They were angry and 
frustrated. The riots were caused by their mistreatment and the oppression that they had 
suffered and were currently suffering at the hands of the regime.84  
The first uprising in 1979 coincided with the occupation of the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca. Initially thought to be a Shi’ite plan, it was planned and executed by Sunnis who 
felt that the Saudi ruling family had been corrupted by their wealth and that the religious 
foundation of the Kingdom was in jeopardy. The Saudi regime was thus being attacked 
not only by a minority Shi’ite uprising but by members of the Sunni majority itself. The 
regime co-opted the religious message of the Sunni rebels and sought to pacify the Shi’a 
by attending to their needs, as the regime soon realized that the demonstrations and riots 
were rooted in the social and economic conditions in which the Shi’a suffered.85 The 
Saudis placated the Shi’ite population, and according to Goldberg:  
Once it became apparent, however, that they [the Shi’a] had scored significant 
economic gains their basic motivation to challenge the Saudi regime disappeared. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that there have been no outburst of 
anger or protests among the Shi’is in Hasa since violent February 1980 and that 
the whole region has been quiet and stable. This is all the more remarkable given 
that throughout this period the Iranian regime has continued to broadcast its 
special radio programs in Arabic and to publish and distribute leaflets, calling 
upon the Shi’is in Hasa to rise against the royal family. It is further proof that the 
basic reasons underlying the Shi’is’ discontent had to do with their social and 
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economic conditions. Once these issues started to be dealt with, the Shi’is became 
satisfied and abandoned any idea of challenging or confronting the Saudi 
regime.86  
The Saudi government came up with a “comprehensive plan” to address the issues faced 
by the Shi’a in the Eastern Province to improve their standard of living. The plan 
“included an electricity project, the reasphalting (sic) of streets, new schools for boys and 
girls, a new hospital, the draining of large areas of swamps, and projects for additional 
street lighting, sewage, and communications.”87 The government seemed to take a 
genuine interest in the needs of the Shi’a population. The Eastern Province uprisings 
were the first political challenge expressed by the Saudi Shi’ite population since the 
founding of the Kingdom. According to Goldberg, “In many respects, not the least being 
their proximity to Iran, the protest by so many members of the Shi’i community had 
graver implications for the regime than the fragmented rebels who had seized the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca on November 20, 1979.”88 The regime saw the Shi’ite uprising as more 
of a threat to them for one reason, the Eastern Province is the heart of Saudi oil 
production. A third of the workers in the oil fields were Shi’ite and there was a real fear 
that they might sabotage oil production, thus injuring the Kingdom’s main source of 
wealth. These oil fields are also close to Iran, making them more susceptible to Iranian 
propaganda, such as Arabic-language broadcasts by Iranian media. Goldberg commented, 
“There was also concern that foreign elements might try to exploit the Shi’is’ grievances 
for their own purposes and endanger the kingdom’s stability.”89  
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Saudi Arabia’s attempt to balance the combatants in the Iran-Iraq War  
The uprisings, however, did not trigger a Saudi turn against the Iranian regime. 
Rather, the Kingdom tried to maintain a balancing act, weighing its options but not 
wanting to disturb the existing state of affairs. This balancing act was a fixture of Saudi 
foreign policy, which favors the status quo and is averse to change, regardless of how 
subtle. But, it was more than a balancing act. Riyadh was mimicking America’s reaction 
to the revolution. For the American government, according to Rubin, “[The revolution] 
was a wasteful diversion, conflicting with real American interests and intentions. Yet this 
view was coupled with a serious misunderstanding of the composition and direction of 
the postrevolutionary (sic) political situation in Iran and by a failure to comprehend the 
attitude of Iranians toward the United States.”90 Furthermore as Rubin pointed out, “[The 
revolutionaries] argued, the United States had actually ruled Iran using the shah as a 
puppet. Consequently, America was responsible for all their country’s woes and for all 
the bloodshed during the revolution, as well as guilty of looting the country of its oil 
wealth.”91  Both states, Saudi Arabia and the US, were engaged in “wishful thinking” 
based on a misreading of the political situation in Iran.92 Rubin argued, “Washington’s 
main global and even regional problem was not Iran but the Soviet Union and its 
influence. Given the importance of the Persian Gulf area and given Iran’s proximity to 
the U.S.S. R., a stable and united Iran was an American objective no matter who ruled 
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Iran.”93 The US did not want Iran to splinter and subsequently come under Soviet 
influence, thus the US sought to maintain good relations with the new government.94  
The hostage crisis issued in a new era for both the United Sates and Saudi Arabia 
in terms of their relationship with Iran.  Riyadh felt that a significant shift toward 
radicalism had occurred in Iranian politics. Iranian students stormed the American 
Embassy in Tehran and took 52 American diplomats hostage in November 1979. 
Although not done under the direction or even the knowledge of Khomeini, he 
nonetheless endorsed the act.95 According to Rubin, “the holding of the hostages became 
a symbol and demonstration of Iran’s independence and opposition to American power.” 
This independence brought about a change and Saudi Arabia shifted its support toward 
Iraq, seeing Iraq as a possible deterrent to Iran’s revolutionary zeal and its ambitions of 
exporting its revolution.96 Riyadh felt threatened by Tehran’s revolutionary policies and 
rising regional prominence. Both threatened Riyadh’s identity within Islam, as well as its 
financial and regime stability. Saudi Arabia was given a chance to test the ability of its 
foreign policy to achieve balance with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War on September 
22, 1980. 
Saudi Arabia had never been close to Iraq. After the Second World War, the 
British installed a Hashemite king in Iraq. The Hashemites had been historical rivals of 
the Saudi ruling family ever since Ibn Saud had ejected the Hashemite rulers from the 
Hijaz, in the western part of the Arabian Peninsula, in his quest to conquer the area. The 
Hashemite King of Iraq, Faisal II, was dethroned by a socialist coup in 1958, but Iraq’s 
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new socialist leaders did not curry favor with the Kingdom as the socialists were anti-
royalist.  
After the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and Saddam Hussein’s assumption of 
power in Iraq in 1979, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated. In September 1980, 
Iraq invaded Iran, osentibly to achieve the following four objectives: 
1) To return the enclaves of Saif Saad and Zain al-Qaws to Iraqi control 
2) To gain full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab 
3) To return the Islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb to the United 
Arab Emirates 
4) To stop Iranian meddling in the domestic affairs of its Arab neighbors as Iran 
attempted to export its revolution.97 
Saddam Hussein tried to frame the war in Pan-Arab terms. His objectives at first glance 
appeared to have Pan-Arab motivations with attempts to win larger Arab support. 
However, they were, in truth, more about his desires to amass more power and to weaken 
and isolate the country he saw as his principal enemy, Iran. On this last point Rouhollah 
Ramazani pointed out, “Saddam Hussein wanted Iraq to fill the power vacuum he saw in 
the entire Gulf region after the Shah’s departure, partly to provide a base for Hussein’s 
bid for leadership in the larger Arab world, a bid that contributed, as seen, to the decision 
to invade Iran.”98 
The United States claimed ignorance when it came to foreknowledge of Iraq’s 
invasion of Iran and declared themselves neutral in the war.99 However, according to 
Rubin, “many U.S. policy makers came to see a continuation of the war as a useful way 
to bog down two of the region’s most highly militarized regimes and stave off short-term 
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threats to the regional order and the political economy of oil. To this end, the United 
Sates supplied weapons, funding, and intelligence to both sides in the conflict.”100 Saudi 
Arabia, however, is rumored to have had knowledge of Saddam’s plans to invade Iran, as 
Saddam visited the Kingdom in August 1980 and supposedly informed the royal family 
of his intentions. Also before this visit, Baghdad and Riyadh signed a security agreement 
stating that an attack on an Arab state was an attack on Iraq.101 There were also rumblings 
of a charter among the Gulf States and Iraq, which indicated that if Iraq were to go to war 
with a non-Arab state, the Arab states would support Iraq.102 
Continuing its pattern of mimicking the example set by the US, Saudi Arabia tried 
to balance both sides of the conflict. However, in November 1980, Baghdad’s war effort 
stumbled and it looked like the war was turning in Tehran’s favor. Riyadh was worried, 
as Khomeini saw the war as a conduit to export the revolution. He believed once Iraq fell, 
so would the rest of the Gulf. Khomeini was not going to conquer Iraq per se; his belief 
was essentially that the natural inclination and desire of all Muslims was for Islamic 
governance. Therefore, the Iraqis would see Iran as “liberators” and model their new 
government after the one in Iran.103 At this point, Riyadh mobilized the other Gulf States 
in support of Baghdad, according to Fürtig. He said that the Gulf States gave financial 
and logistical support to Iraq with most of this support coming from Saudi Arabia. The 
Kingdom did whatever it could to assist Iraq’s war effort short of military participation, 
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because of Saudi fears of Iranian retaliation.104 According to an interview conducted by 
Keynoush with Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi ambassador and director of Saudi 
intelligence, Saudi Arabia did not give financial support to Iraq until Iran invaded Iraq 
two years into the war, not in 1980 as argued by Fürtig. An unnamed Iranian official 
whom Keynoush interviewed for her book corroborates al-Faisal’s claim. The official 
said that Iran was under the impression that Saudi Arabia did not aid Iraq at the outset of 
the war. There appears to be a discrepancy as to the exact moment when Riyadh began to 
support Baghdad financially, but Riyadh’s support of Baghdad was not in dispute.  
By 1982, Iran was able to regain the territory it had lost to Iraq initially in the war, 
and it began an invasion of Iraq. This turn of events raised fears among the Gulf States of 
a possible Iranian victory. To put an end to the conflict, Saudi Arabia offered to mediate 
between the warring states. Riyadh offered to give Tehran $70 billion to rebuild if it 
stopped fighting, but Khomeini was not interested in ending the war. 105 Khomeini turned 
down the offer because, for him, the war was a religious crusade. For the entire Muslim 
community to be governed by Islamic governance, Iran needed to be successful in 
thwarting atheist Iraq.  
In 1984, the IRI attempted to curtail Iraqi tankers, and any other tankers perceived 
to be carrying Iraqi oil, from navigating the Straits of Hormuz. Iraq’s action toward Iran 
precipitated what became known as the “tanker war,” which adversely affected the Gulf 
economies. Iraq targeted Iran’s oil facilities both on- and offshore, and Iran retaliated. 
Keynoush explained, “Iran declared that Gulf security was indivisible, and that it would 
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not allow their waterway to remain secure for some states and not others.”106 Iran began 
the tanker war because it was unable to target Iraqi vessels, as most Iraqi oil was being 
transported overland through a pipeline funded by the Saudis. Instead, Iran could target 
the vessels of countries supporting the Iraqi war effort. According to Ray Takeyh, it was 
Iraq’s actions of targeting Iran’s oil facilities that led to the tanker war.107  
Although targeting tankers of countries supporting Iraq affected the Saudi 
economy, Tehran did not wish to alienate, and thus provoke, Baghdad’s main sponsor. 
Takeyh confirms, “Iran had a limited interest in extending the war to the Gulf 
emirates.”108 Rather, the Iranian government, according to Fürtig, “sought to improve 
relations with Saudi Arabia and to coax the Kingdom away from its one-sided support for 
Iraq.”109 However, the tanker war caused Riyadh and the other Gulf States to go to the 
Arab League to condemn Iran’s actions. With the Arab League’s support, Saudi Arabia 
secured a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Iran’s actions and 
guaranteeing the freedom of movement in international waters by nonparticipants in the 
conflict. Iran rebuked the resolution because the UN failed to condemn Iraq as the 
belligerent. Also, the resolution was worded in such a way that Iraq’s bombing of Iran’s 
oil facilities was acceptable because they occurred within the theatre of war. Iran’s 
actions were condemned because they were against nonparticipants and happened outside 
the designated arena of the war.110  
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The resolution led to secret negotiations between Tehran and Riyadh to find ways 
of ending the conflict. Again, Saudi Arabia offered to help Iran rebuild. Numerous 
meetings took place over the next couple of years, but to no avail, as the Iranians insisted 
on Saddam’s removal from power as a condition for a potential ceasefire. Keynoush 
suggested that Iran would not capitulate because:  
The war helped Tehran consolidate central power after the revolution by 
mobilizing Iranian nationalism, controlling the army, and simultaneously cracking 
down on dissent. Moreover, peace proposals, especially during Iran’s 
advancement seemed insincere, and Tehran felt disheartened when the proposals 
failed to recognize Iraq as the aggressor.111 
 When negotiations stalled, the Kingdom continued to aid Iraq financially and 
logistically, allowing Iraqi planes to land and refuel in Saudi Arabia on their way to and 
from Iran. This was a risky venture for the Saudis, but terrorist attacks presumably 
undertaken by the Iranians against Kuwait only strengthened Saudi resolve.112 
Despite the UN Resolution, Iran did not stop targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf. 
In 1987, the Soviets offered to assist Kuwait, whose tankers were under bombardment by 
Iran. The Soviets proposed the chartering of Soviet vessels to Kuwait, so that Kuwait 
could ship its oil freely under another flag, based on the assumption that Iran would be 
reticent to fire on a superpower’s vessels. The United States countered the Soviet 
proposal and offered to reflag Kuwait vessels as American tankers to ensure the security 
of the oil shipping routes. At the same time, the US sent its warships into the Gulf. 
Oddly, Iran, not Iraq, was blamed for the escalation of the war and the involvement of 
other powers in the conflict. Despite foreign involvement in the conflict, Tehran 
continued to target ships in the Persian Gulf. Iran tried not to target American ships, but it 
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eventually did hit an American ship. In retaliation, the US destroyed an Iranian offshore 
oil facility in 1988. The participation of foreign powers, according to Keynoush, both 
escalated the war and hastened its end. Rubin discussed the extent of American 
involvement and engagement with Iran during the war. He stated: 
American and Iranian military forces exchanged fire on several occasions in 1987. 
Hostilities escalated in 1988, with the United States sinking several Iranian 
warships and damaging oil platforms. That summer the USS Vincennes shot down 
an Iranian passenger jet, killing all 290 civilians on board. The incident was a 
stunning blow to Iran, and one that effectively sapped its will to fight further.113 
With the involvement of foreign powers, the war promptly came to a halt. Although 
neither side signed a ceasefire agreement, hostilities ceased in 1988. Shahram Chubin 
explained that “the internationalisation (sic) of the war, regional isolation and the threat 
of a future comprehensive arms embargo increased the psychological pressure on Iran… 
[and] had also begun to diminish the domestic enthusiasm for the war…[furthermore,] 
the cost of continuing the war without any decisive result was beginning to be felt.”114 
The above factors moved Iran closer to ending the war but, Chubin stated, “Only a 
perception that the continuation of the war would threaten the very existence of the 
Islamic republic, Khomeini’s legacy, could have done so.”115 Thus as the morale of Iran’s 
citizens and fighters waned and Iranians lost faith in their revolution and their leaders 
after a series of defeats at the hands of Iraq, Khomeini accepted the ceasefire. The war 
had been “a direct outgrowth from it [the revolution]” and as such the success of the 
revolution depended on winning the war and the creation by the Iraqi people of an 
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Islamic-styled republic.116 Neither of these aspects was forthcoming. According to 
Chubin, “The major casualty of the war had been the credibility of the Islamic republic 
among its own rank and file. It will no longer be able to call effectively upon its populace 
for crusades and sacrifices, but will have to act like a traditional state.”117 Khomeini died 
soon after accepting the ceasefire, and the process of rebuilding Iran began under the 
looming specter of Khomeini and diminished revolutionary zeal.  
 
The Iran-Iraq War and the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council  
One of the steps taken by Saudi Arabia to insulate itself from the war was its 
involvement in the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. The GCC, 
also known as the “Six,” included several Gulf States. The Six consisted of Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. These states were deeply 
distrustful of Iraq, Iran, and both of their intentions. These countries also came together 
to discuss issues such as mutual defense, the limitation of foreign fleets, a ban on foreign 
military bases, freedom of navigation, the division of the Gulf waterways, and to support 
each other against potential coups.118 Although there was a prior history of cooperation 
on these issues while under the British protectorate, the events surrounding Iran and Iraq 
were the primary impetus for the council’s formation. Ramazani posited, “In fact, the 
Saudi leaders’ desire to draw closer to the smaller sheikdoms stemmed from their need to 
protect themselves as well as their weak associates against not only Iran, but also the still-
suspect Ba’thist revolutionary regime.”119 Each of these states had a sizable Shi’ite 
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population and/or Iranian expatriate workforce, toward which Iran had made overtures 
enticing them to rise up against the monarchies, which Iran perceived to be Western 
puppet regimes. 
The founding of the GCC was not just a reaction to the Iran-Iraq War. In reality, 
however, this was only one of the perquisites for its foundation. Since its revolution, Iran 
had presented itself as a threat to the continued reign of the Gulf monarchs. Gerd 
Nonneman pointed out: 
Iranian policy, indeed, was crucial in determining the policies of the Six toward 
Tehran and the war: all feared the impact of the revolution, all attempted to 
appease this new threat initially, all then, albeit to varying degrees, veered toward 
Iraq in the face of explicit ideological threats issuing from leading figures in 
Tehran. Yet none were willing to ignore possibilities of improving relations with 
the Islamic Republic if there appeared a chance.120  
Like Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States had made overtures to Iran to prevent it from 
interfering in their domestic politics and enticing their populace to rise up against the 
monarchies. In addition to the fear of Iranian intervention in their domestic politics, two 
other factors influenced the GCC to support Iraq over Iran in the war. According to 
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The first was the gradual rapprochement between Iraq and 
the Arab Gulf States after 1975, while the second was the perceived threat to the Gulf 
States’ legitimacy, internal security, and external stability resulting from Iranian pan-
Islamism after 1979.”121 After 1975, Iraq shed its revolutionary and socialist zeal and 
sought to make Pan-Arabism a priority as a way of securing a leadership position in the 
region. Ramazani also pointed out that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
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potential for American intervention in the region to secure the supply of oil were also 
essential to the formation of the GCC. Iran had traditionally served as a buffer between 
the Gulf and the Soviets. Now, with Iran preoccupied, there was a risk of the Soviets 
interfering in other Muslim countries beyond Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, Iraq’s attitude toward the Soviet Union changed drastically, and 
Iraq no longer aligned itself with the Soviets. Iraq, once dependent on the Soviets for 
arms, was able to diversify its suppliers due to increased oil income after the Arab oil 
embargo of 1973.122 This change in alignment impacted the way the Gulf States viewed 
Iraq, in that they saw realignment as a positive development.  
Soviet actions were also worrisome, especially after American President Jimmy 
Carter laid out the Carter Doctrine in his State of the Union Address in January 1980. In 
that speech, Carter promised American intervention in the region to ensure the supply of 
oil so as to prevent any harm to the American economy. Carter’s speech, directed toward 
the Soviets, was a threat against further intrusion into the region. Jones pointed out, “the 
soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Carter to make clear America’s deep attachment 
to the Persian Gulf and U.S. willingness to use militarily force to protect the flow of 
oil…Carter mapped out a new strategic/military vision for the region…the era of direct 
American intervention in the Persian Gulf began.”123 Rubin echoed this point by stating 
“the Carter Doctrine demonstrated the increased concern with the Gulf region. The 
undeniable economic and strategic importance of the area, the potential for greater 
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instability created by the Iran-Iraq war, and the growing Soviet presence in the region, all 
raised its priority in the eyes of American policy makers.”124 
The Gulf States had a different view toward the doctrine; they saw it not as a 
protective umbrella, but rather they saw themselves as pieces in a game in which they had 
little say. There was a corresponding fear that the whole region would become embroiled 
in war and chaos as the superpowers fought among themselves. This feeling of 
vulnerability to the machinations of the superpowers contributed to the rise of the GCC.  
During the Iran-Iraq War, the GCC maintained an outward position of neutrality, 
as a victory by either Tehran or Baghdad was not desirable. Support for the two 
combatants varied among the GCC states. However, they believed that a short war could 
be the shock Iran needed to end its revolutionary proselytizing.125 Keynoush pointed out:  
A victorious Iran or Iraq could harbor future regional ambitions and disrupt the 
balance of power. This outlook allowed the organization to maintain open 
channels of communication with both Iran and Iraq throughout the war, as did 
growing division within GCC. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain 
supported Iraq, Oman and the U.A.E. were supportive of Iran given their cultural 
and social affinities with the country.126  
Additionally, the distance of Oman and UAE from Iraq contributed to their lack of desire 
to support Iraq, as there was less of a fear of the war spreading to them. Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia contributed the bulk of the financial assistance to Iraq, to the tune of $50 billion, 
because of the fear that an Iranian victory would lead to the creation of an Iraqi Shi’ite 
state. Besides financial assistance, those members of the GCC aligned with Iraq provided 
logistical support, such as the use of their ports and airbases, information on Iranian troop 
movement, and assistance to Iraq in selling its oil when Iran prevented it from being able 
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to do so. Also, through OPEC, these countries kept oil prices low, which hurt Iran’s 
ability to finance its war effort.127 Although many of the members of the GCC supported 
Iraq, Baghdad’s ambitions prevented them from extending an invitation to Iraq to join the 
council. Iraq, dependent on the GCC for assistance, was not in a position to object.128  
Unlike Baghdad, Tehran was alone. It was isolated by the West through sanctions 
stemming from the hostage crisis. Tehran did not have benefactors with deep pockets, nor 
did it have strong allies. Saudi Arabia had cut diplomatic ties with Iran in 1988, an action 
that had not been mimicked by the other GCC states, as the policies of the GCC countries 
toward Iran and Iraq differed. 129  
 
Conclusion 
Iran wanted to unite Muslims and create other Islamic republics in its own image. 
However, Iran had difficulty inciting non-Shi’ites to revolt against their governments. It 
even had difficulty inciting other Shi’ites, as many did not ascribe to Khomeini’s politics, 
nor did they see him as their spiritual leader. 
One of the reasons, as Fürtig pointed out, for the amicable relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran up until the revolution was that the Shah and the Saudi royal 
family saw themselves as operating in different spheres.130 The Shah’s secular leanings 
did not encroach upon the presumptive Saudi leadership in matters of Islam. With 
Khomeini, however, this dynamic changed. At first, the Saudis attempted to use the 
vocabulary of Revolutionary Iran to smooth the transition and maintain an alliance 
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following in the footsteps of America’s concilitaory attitude toward Iran, but Iran had 
different ambitions and sought to supplant Saudi Arabia and eject America’s presence 
from the Gulf.  
Tehran was undermining Riyadh’s authority and legitimacy. Therefore, it was 
only natural for Riyadh to align itself with Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq had an 
agenda that at times also appeared to challenge Saudi Arabia, because Iraq wanted to fill 
the power vacuum left by the Shah’s Iran. Iraq’s desires left Saudi Arabia in a precarious 
position, and Riyadh attempted to uphold the status quo by keeping an open dialogue 
with Iran for most of the war. At the same time, it provided support to Iraq by helping to 
form the GCC and by mobilizing the other Gulf States to aid Baghdad’s war effort. Saudi 
Arabia aided Iraq, even though a victory by either Baghdad or Tehran was not a favorable 
outcome in Riyadh’s eyes, as either side might be emboldened by its victory to consider 
further aggression toward the other Gulf States. In the end, both Iran and Iraq were 
denied victory. The fruitless war left hundreds of thousands dead on both sides, while 
neither side was able to regain any new territory. Khomeini died shortly after accepting 
the ceasefire with Iraq. His death paved the way for more pragmatic elements in Iran’s 
government to come to the fore. When they did, they sought to re-engage with Saudi 
Arabia, ushering in an era of rapprochement between the states and thawing the once icy 
relationship. This new era, however, did not equal a similar warming of relations between 
the US and Iran, instead the US continued to isolate Iran. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE SAUDI-IRANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT (1989-2011) 
 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent death of the Ayatollah Khomeini 
marked a transition in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran but not a similar 
transition in the relationship between Iran and the US. The shift in the relationship 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia is often attributed to the personal relationship between 
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Mohammad Khatami of Iran.131 
However, the groundwork for this new era of understanding between the two countries is 
properly attributable to the Iranian President after the death of Khomeini, Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani. According to Anoushravan Ehteshami, after the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) wanted “to recover ground lost in the debilitating war and, 
in doing so, to reassert its influence in the region. To recover economically and militarily 
entails the ending of Iran’s regional and international isolation.”132 Rafsanjani initially 
developed the policies that Tehran enacted to end its isolation. 
This period was turbulent. After Iraq invaded, occupied, and annexed Kuwait in 
1990, the United States threatened, and subsequently invaded Iraq to remove the Iraqi 
presence from Kuwait. The US did not accomplish this feat alone; it had the assistance of 
34 other nations. During this turbulent time, the Soviet Union collapsed. The Cold War 
was over and years of bipolarity were replaced with the United Sates being the sole 
superpower.  
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Violence bookends this era; the Iran-Iraq War began the period and the beginning 
of the Arab Spring in late 2010 marked its end. Tehran and Riyadh took different sides 
during the Arab Spring uprisings that spread throughout the Middle East. While Tehran 
mostly saw the uprisings as an extension of their revolution, Riyadh saw them as 
disruptive of the status quo. As a result, in the various uprisings each country aligned 
itself with different factions. 
 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War and Iran’s attempt to rebuild both its nation and its 
reputation  
 
Khomeini died in June 1989, soon after the passage of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 598 calling for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. Even before 
Khomeini’s death, Rafsanjani had emerged as the strongest candidate for president. 
Khomeini had appointed Rafsanjani to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the 
military in 1988, an act some scholars view as an initial sign that Iran wanted to change 
its outward image.133 Rafsanjani’s more prominent role in Iranian politics signaled this 
change, as he had long been considered a moderate among Iran’s political elite. Shireen 
T. Hunter discussed Rafsanjani’s politics, pointing out, “Within the murky and ill-defined 
factionalism of Khomeini’s Iran, Rafsanjani had long been labeled a moderate because of 
his support for private enterprise, his misgivings about Soviet intentions, his willingness 
to improve Iran’s relations with the West and his periodic remarks about the possibility of 
resolving U.S.-Iranian differences.”134 Rafsanjani’s political stance, along with his 
support of the Khomeini’s fatwa calling for the death of Salman Rushdie, the author of 
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The Satanic Verses, galvanized support from the more radical factions in Iran.135 
Subsequently, in the July 1989 election Rafsanjani won the presidency, garnering support 
from multiple factions. However, Rafsanjani ran mostly uncontested, since the opposition 
candidate was an unknown. Rafsanjani secured 85% of the votes, but his victory was 
lackluster because voter turnout was low. The minimal public participation tarnished 
Rafsanjani’s win, stopping short of giving him a mandate for change within Iran. His 
election is sometimes referred to as the birth of the second Islamic Republic because it 
marked a departure from the revolutionary politics that characterized the first decade in 
Iran after the revolution.136  
The relatively smooth transition of power after Khomeini’s death was deliberate. 
Hunter pointed out, “The surprising unity and speed of the Iranian transfer of power 
reflected acute awareness that any sign of strife or delay would encourage internal and 
external enemies and would endanger the regime’s survival,” but also that Iran watchers 
believed that Khomeini’s death would leave a power vacuum in the country and result in 
fighting among the various factions. 137  
A few months prior to his death, Khomeini dismissed his chosen successor, 
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri because Montazeri was critical of the regime. When 
Montazeri was removed as the next-in-line to follow Khomeini, the choices of who could 
succeed him were limited. Most of the clerics who had supported the revolution and were 
currently involved in the government were low- or mid-ranking. The higher-ranking 
clergy did not support the revolution. According to Olivier Roy, “the Revolution has 
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weakened the traditional Shi’i clerical structure in favor of a political organization. All 
the ‘traditional’ Shi’i clerical logic…has been ignored or bypassed by institutions created 
by the Islamic Revolution.”138 The Iranian political structure could not pull another leader 
from high-ranking members of the Iranian Shi’ite clerical establishment. Despite this 
dearth of potential talent, Farhang Jahanpour believed that Rafsanjani had strong 
influence in the choice of the next leader due to his close relationship with Khomeini 
before Khomeini’s death.139 Despite having his own aspirations to be Supreme Leader, 
Rafsanjani lacked the essential credentials to hold such a position. He was not a 
descendent of the Prophet, nor was he a high-ranking cleric. Jahanpour used the term 
“king maker” to describe Rafsanjani’s role in the Assembly of Experts’140 decision to 
pick Sayed Ali Khamenei. The body took Rafsanjani’s suggestion that Khamenei should 
be Supreme Leader after Rafsanjani hinted that Khomeini himself wanted Khamenei to 
rule after his death. Although Khamenei was not a high-ranking cleric, he was a 
descendent of the Prophet and, immediately after he was placed in the position of 
Supreme Leader, was given the title of Ayatollah.141 He also received vows of allegiance 
from all the branches of government including the cabinet, the parliament, and the 
military.  
Initially, Rafsanjani went to work attempting to rebuild Iran’s economy and 
military following the war, which had left the country in great disarray. Virtually isolated 
after the war, Iran, through the actions of its new president, went about rebuilding its 
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reputations through a “diplomatic charm offensive.”142 Al-Toraifi said  “Rafsanjani’s 
prime objective in pursuing such politics was to recover ground lost during the eight 
years of the Iran-Iraq War, and consequently to reassert Iran’s influence in the region.”143 
To rebuild, Iran needed to reintegrate itself into the global community. The first step was 
to publicly distance itself from the once prominent goal of exporting its revolution. 
According to Fürtig, “For its part the Iranian government had to guarantee its ability to 
respect agreements and to create the right political conditions for peaceful trade and 
reconstruction to re-establish credibility. The minimum requirement for economic 
credibility was the elimination of the constant threat to export the revolution.”144 
Therefore, economic reconstruction required Rafsanjani, “to reassess the priorities of the 
Islamic revolution.”145 Reconstruction replaced exporting the revolution as the top 
priority of the regime. The media and politicians, for the time being, abandoned 
revolutionary rhetoric in the attempts to appear “moderate and cooperative” to attract 
foreign investment.146  
As it rebuilt, the IRI sought to repair not only its economy but also its broken 
international relationships, a difficult task given the rancor and vitriol that had been 
spewed by Khomeini against the Arab monarchies, specifically Saudi Arabia. Even from 
the grave in the form of his last will and testament, Khomeini called the monarch of 
Saudi Arabia a charlatan and then trivialized Saudi Wahhabism as a “superstitious cult” 
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and therefore not a legitimate form of Islam.147 Rafsanjani, in turn, expressed regret over 
the state of the relationship between Iran and its neighbors and attempted to regain their 
trust. He stated “‘ We did not have expansionist intentions from the beginning, just as our 
southern neighbours (sic) do not have aggressive designs…We urge our southern 
neighbours (sic)…to co-operate with us in order to resolve existing issues concerning the 
oil market, maritime laws and Resolution 598 [i.e. relations with Iraq].’”148 Rafsanjani 
affirmed that having a good relationship with the Gulf States was imperative because Iran 
received 90% of its income from oil sales and needed to secure stable yet high oil prices 
within OPEC. The Gulf States also offered a new market for goods exported from Iran, 
and were potential investors in Iran’s economy.149 Keynoush stated, “Iran’s foreign 
policy in this period reflected an understanding among its leaders that economic realities 
prevailed over ideological consideration.”150 Exporting the revolution did not necessarily 
become an ideology of the past, but it transformed to fit with Iran’s new mission as a 
peaceful neighbor ripe for investment and key to regional stability. By being exemplars 
of a stable and prosperous republic governed by Islamic principles, Iran could be the face 
of revolution, setting an example of peace and stability that others would want to 
emulate. 
However, a potential relationship with the Gulf States was stymied by Riyadh’s 
troubled relationship with Tehran in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War.151 Riyadh, as the 
dominant member of the GCC, dictated many of the actions undertaken by the other 
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members, and its refusal to renew diplomatic ties with Tehran hindered Iran’s 
relationship with the rest of the Gulf. Complicating matters and preventing reconciliation 
was Riyadh’s continuing close tie with Baghdad. Keynoush noted, “the fragile state of 
the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq and Iran’s internal political transition made the Saudis 
uneasy about resuming ties with Iran.”152 But, within a year, the nature of the relationship 
between Riyadh and Tehran was dramatically altered, thanks to Baghdad’s aggressive 
behavior.  
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait aided Iran’s effort to change its relationship with the 
Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia. Chubin and Tripp mentioned, “Iraq’s aggression 
against Kuwait gave Iran a reprieve. Without effacing the memory of Iran as a potential 
threat, it gave Tehran a chance to redefine its interests and integrate itself into Persian 
Gulf politics. With Iraq ostracised (sic) from Gulf politics, Iran’s importance was 
correspondingly enhanced.”153 The Gulf monarchies began to fear Iraq’s penchant for 
expansionism, making it easier for Iran to drive a wedge between Iraq and its former 
supporters. Now, instead of Iraq being a bulwark against potential Iranian aggression in 
the Gulf, the Gulf monarchies needed to be rescued from Iraqi aggression. This need 
threw a wrench into Saudi foreign policy, because the Saudis had historically used Iraq to 
balance Iranian aggression. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States turned instead toward 
the United States, relying heavily on an outside presence for support. This policy, 
however, was not without risks. The Iranians were against any foreign presence in the 
Gulf, and reliance on America might put more strain on the already fragile relationship 
between the Iranians and the Saudis.  
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 American intervention in the Gulf affairs distressed the Iranians. However, 
Tehran decided to remain passive and neutral during the war. Tehran’s next moves 
needed to be calculated. It, therefore, supported the UN resolutions against Iraq. Tehran 
saw a solution involving the UN as preferable to the US acting alone. Iran, despite its 
desire for reintegration, was still against Western, particularly American, involvement in 
the region.  
Iran also was the first state to object to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iran proclaimed 
that Kuwaiti sovereignty should be respected and that Iraq should withdraw from the 
country. Iran recognized the legitimacy of the Emir of Kuwait’s rule, a complete reversal 
of position given Iran’s previous attempt to overthrow the monarchy in its support of 
Kuwaiti opposition groups. Ehteshami recalled, “In 1990, thus, Iran stood on the side of 
the West and for Kuwaiti sovereignty and the right of its Emir to rule the sheikhdom, 
when just a few years earlier it had not only tried to secure the demise of the ruling Al-
Sabah family through support for Islamic dissident forces in Kuwait, but had played a 
significant part in escalating regional tensions.”154 Remaining neutral was the best move 
Iran could make. It could not support Iraq, which had been until recently, its adversary, 
and it could not completely support the American-led coalition, since this would 
undermine its desire for a Gulf independent from Western powers.  
Neither objecting to nor supporting the conflict allowed Tehran to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of a weakened Baghdad. Mohsen Milani describes the policy that 
Rafsanjani and, by extension, Iran, took during the Gulf War. “He [Rafsanjani] opted for 
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what I called active neutrality: by choosing to stand on the sidelines without antagonizing 
either Baghdad or Washington, Iran would be acting to promote its national interests.”155  
For its part, Iran took in Gulf War refugees fleeing Iraq and Kuwait, thereby 
boosting its image among the Gulf States. According to Ehteshami, as a result of the Gulf 
War, “Iran launched its own diplomatic offensive aimed at enhancing and consolidating 
its regional influence through the isolation of Iraq and the opening of hitherto closed 
Arab doors.”156 Tehran was maneuvering to be viewed as a counterweight to Baghdad’s 
aggression. Iran also hoped that, by being seen in this light, the need for American 
protection could be eliminated and Iran would be invited to participate in Gulf security 
arrangements. Iranian participation in Gulf security was wishful thinking on Iran’s part. 
The actions undertaken by more radical elements of the Iranian government would 
undermine Rafsanjani’s efforts. Until then, he was able to mend many Gulf relationships 
successfully, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Iran was rewarded for its neutrality with a thaw in its relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. Diplomatic relations had been severed in 1988, but in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War, the two countries reestablished diplomatic ties, and Rafsanjani visited Riyadh in 
1991.157 Saudi Arabia was surprised by Iran’s stance in the war and saw Tehran’s 
neutrality as a respectable move. 158 Riyadh rewarded Tehran accordingly, and responded 
cordially to Rafsanjani’s overtures. However, noted Fürtig, the two countries did not 
resolve any questions regarding security, since Saudi Arabia was relying heavily on the 
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United States to secure its position in the Gulf. Iran, on the other hand, did not want a 
foreign presence in the Gulf, especially America. Iran wanted to show not only Saudi 
Arabia, but the Gulf monarchies as well, that it should be involved in all security 
relationships and that the Gulf States should not be so reliant on America. Fürtig further 
added that Tehran and Riyadh were ideologically at odds, still seeing the other as an 
enemy.159 However, relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC remained important to Iran 
because “oil, the location of the most important religious centres (sic) of Islam, and the 
American military presence” were the main areas of interests to Iran.”160  
 
Challenges to Rafsanjani’s foreign policy initiative  
Rafsanjani faced challenges to his attempts at overtures to the Arab regimes. 
Noted Ehteshami, “The general reduction in the Second Republic’s hostile and anti-Arab 
propaganda since September 1989 has opened many doors to Tehran, but it has so 
frustrated the Iranian hard-liners that have sought their own independent avenues of 
criticism of the new policies.”161 The new Supreme Leader of Iran, Khamenei, was the 
means for confronting Rafsanjani’s policies. As mentioned earlier, Khamenei threatened 
to undermine any of Rafsanjani’s efforts that he perceived to go against Khomeini’s 
revolutionary ideology. Khamenei had this ability due to the amendments that the Iranian 
government made to the constitution after Khamenei died. The Supreme Leader, 
according to the Iranian Constitution, controls the military and makes foreign policy. 
Keynoush pointed out: 
Article 110 of the constitution defines four different contexts in which the 
[supreme] leader, rather than the president, retains a prerogative over foreign 
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policy. The [supreme] leader has the power and duty to delineate general foreign 
policy, exercise supervision over the execution of those policies, issue decrees 
and resolve disputes in consultation with Expediency Council. The [supreme] 
leader also retains direct control over the armed forces and the security apparatus. 
In effect, the [supreme] leader controls at least half of the country’s foreign 
policy.162 
Khamenei’s control over numerous areas of foreign policy aggravated the domestic 
situation in Iran and led to a bifurcation of power and policy narrative. With this control, 
Khamenei thwarted Rafsanjani’s efforts at conciliatory moves toward the Gulf States, and 
thus indirectly hampered the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement. The controversy over the 
island of Abu Musa is an example of the way Khamenei hindered Rafsanjani’s efforts.  
 
The Abu Musa incident 
Since the British vacated the Gulf in 1971, Iran and the UAE have shared 
sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Bypassing 
Rafsanjani, in April 1992 Khamenei ordered the expulsion of Emiratis from these islands. 
In a scramble to reduce tensions in the Gulf, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akhbar 
Velayati, said that the expulsion only applied to non-citizens, specifically the expatriate 
workforce. Rafsanjani assured the Emiratis that Iran would abide by the 1971 signed 
agreement between the two countries. The UAE, for its part, was not in any hurry to 
make the situation an international incident as it stood to lose money if it objected to 
Iranian actions. The UAE was making money through exporting goods to Iran and did 
not want to jeopardize this lucrative relationship. Later that year in August, Iranian 
Marines occupied the islands and deported the Emirati citizens. Consequently, Iran 
asserted full sovereignty over the islands. By seizing these islands, Iran demonstrated 
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how its foreign policy had changed from one led by dogma to one driven by national 
interests. Menashri stated, “Clearly, Iran wished to control these islands not as a means to 
advance ideological creed but to advance its strategic interests by establishing Iranian 
control over the entrance to the Persian Gulf…Under the Islamic regime, Iran based its 
claim to sovereignty over the islands on historical, legal and geographical facts.”163 
According to Menashri, Khamenei was not trying to thwart Rafsanjani’s overtures to the 
Gulf States per se, but to aggrandize Iranian power. However, increasing Iranian power, 
especially over a waterway vital to the economies of the Gulf States, was not a ploy by 
Khamenei to win allies. The move was viewed as further isolating Iran and confusing 
others as to the real Iranian agenda. 
Iranian actions reaffirmed the belief of the Gulf States that Iran had not changed 
its ideological views and still harbored hegemonic aspirations. They strengthened the 
view that their bilateral security arrangements with the United States were justified and 
necessary. The Iranians, for their part, saw these bilateral agreements as a sign of distrust 
that undermined its overtures. Tehran’s idea of security arrangements in the Gulf did not 
involve Western powers. Rather, the IRI saw an arrangement in which it was somehow 
involved. But the occupation of Abu Musa negated many of Rafsanjani’s efforts at 
repairing Tehran’s relations, not only with Saudi Arabia, but with the other Gulf 
monarchies as well. Keynoush said, “As a result of its act, Iran struggled to prove that its 
goals in the Gulf remained peaceful for years after.”164 
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The influence of American foreign policy on Saudi-Iranian relations  
 
Soon after, although not necessarily connected to the events in Abu Musa, the 
United States enacted a policy of dual containment. The policy sought to curb the 
ambitions of not just Iran but Iraq as well. The US saw itself “as the dominant power in 
the region, uniquely capable of influencing the course of events…in the face of 
determined efforts by both Iran and Iraq to rebuild their arsenals, particularly in the 
nuclear and ballistic missile field.”165 The US saw Iraq and Iran as the main hindrances to 
stability in the Middle East.  Martin Indyk, the special assistant to President Clinton for 
Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, outlined the policy 
in a speech he gave in 1993. He stated, “The Clinton administration’s policy of ‘dual 
containment’ of Iraq and Iran derives in the first instance from an assessment that the 
current Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to American interests in the region.”166  
After the Gulf War, the Clinton administration inherited an Iraq with Saddam 
Hussein still in power and still hostile to the US by being hostile to American interests in 
the Gulf. As espoused by Indyk, “The regime of Saddam Hussein must never again pose 
a threat to Iraq’s neighborhood.”167 To prevent it from being a threat, the US sought to 
isolate it economically, politically and militarily from regional affairs. Similarly, the 
administration saw Iran and its regime as remaining hostile to the US. Indyk laid out five 
areas in which Iran was hostile to American interests.  He said: 
It [Iran] is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the 
globe. Through its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran is doing its best to 
thwart our efforts to promote peace between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab 
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states. Through its connections with Sudan, Iran is fishing in troubled waters 
across the Arab world, actively seeking to subvert friendly governments. Through 
its active efforts to acquire offensive weapons, Iran is seeking an ability to 
dominate the Gulf by military means. And, perhaps most disturbing, Iran is 
seeking a weapons of mass destruction capability including clandestine nuclear 
weapons capability and ballistic missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction 
to the Middle East.168   
Like with Iraq, the US sought to isolate Iran.  
Indyk framed the policy as different from previous administrations’ Middle East 
policy. Instead of using either Iran or Iraq to balance the other, the US, using its allies 
will counter the ambitions of both Iran and Iraq.  He stated:  
Accordingly, we do not accept the argument that we should continue the old 
balance of power game, building up one to balance the other. We reject that 
approach not only because its bankruptcy was demonstrated in Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait. We reject it because of a clear-headed assessment of the antagonism that 
both regimes harbor towards the United States and its allies in the region. And we 
reject it because we don’t need to rely on one to balance the other.169  
Despite, not wishing to use either Iran or Iraq to balance the other, the US still engaged in 
a balancing act.  During this period, the US also sought to build up Saudi Arabia 
militarily along with other Middle Eastern allies to, in his words, “preserve a balance of 
power in our favor in the wider Middle East region.”170  
The policy of dual containment has been criticized as being “static” in regards to 
Iran; “the policy calls for a substantial transformation of Iran’s policies and behaviour 
(sic) without establishing any benchmarks by which Iranian actions can be measured and 
without identifying how those changes might alter US policy.”171 It appears that the US 
just bundled Iran into its policy to isolate Iraq but Gary Sick said that the policy toward 
Iraq was equally haphazard, requiring nothing short of removal of Saddam as the leader 
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of Iraq before the US ended sanctions against the country.172 Although seemingly an 
inconsistent strategy for Sick, dual containment for F. Gregory Gause III was not just a 
continuation of American policy in the Middle East but, “the culmination of a trend 
toward increasingly direct American strategic role in the gulf (sic).”173 Gause pointed out: 
America’s interest in the Gulf remains appropriately unchanged with the end of 
the Cold War: guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of oil to the world market at 
prices that do not damage the economies of the United States and its allies in the 
advanced industrial world. What has changed is the perception of where the 
threats to that interest lie, and how the United States should respond.174  
For Gause, “It (the policy] assigns to the United States a unilateral role in managing gulf 
(sic) security issues.”175 America’s participation in the Gulf War led to “precipitating an 
even more dramatic escalation of American military intervention in the Gulf.”176 Toby 
Craig Jones agreed with Gause that the dual containment led to more American 
militarism in the Gulf. He stated, “The official American policy immediately after the 
war was one of containing both Iraq and Iran—keeping the region’s ‘rogue’ states from 
threatening the other oil producers. By the end of the 1990s, however, containment had 
given way to a policy of regime change, the high-water mark of direct American 
militarism in the region.”177 
Gause predicted in 1994 a host of problems that have come to fruition in 2017. 
The most notable of these problems was the role Iran would play in an Iraq devoid of 
Saddam. He said, “The problem with dual containment is it fails to address, and in fact 
makes more likely, the worst possible outcome for American interest in the area, collapse 
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of the Iraqi domestic situation into chaos that Iran can exploit,” a void that Iran did 
exploit after the fall of Saddam in 2003. 178  Furthermore, Gause discussed the other 
issues with dual containment, such as the need for massive cooperation between several 
parties to contain both states. Most pointedly is the need for cooperation from Saudi 
Arabia, which the US was arming in order to balance Iran and Iraq to prevent any 
potential hostilities coming from either isolated nation.  However, as noted, Saudi Arabia 
had been opening up to Iran because it saw Iraq as a major threat, more than Iran. Iran 
was less of a threat because it had reduced support of groups opposed to Gulf monarchies 
and a reduction of propaganda aimed at toppling these regimes. Despite sidelining 
Saudi’s main rival and by extension keeping the other Gulf monarchies dependent on the 
US, the policy led to a disjointed policy between the US and Saudi Arabia in their 
relations toward Iran.   
 
The accession of Crown Prince Abdullah and his impact on Saudi foreign policy  
In 1995, Crown Prince Abdullah sought to further ameliorate relations between 
the two countries. He assumed control of the daily operations of the Saudi government 
after his half-brother, King Fahd, became incapacitated by a stroke. Abdullah thought 
that Saudi Arabia should reduce its heavy reliance on American military support and 
place “a priority on regional relationships.”179 Abdullah was trying to distance Saudi 
Arabia from its position of dependency on the US. The reason Abdullah was eager to 
distance Saudi Arabia from the US and form stronger regional relationships was because 
he was, according to Mehran Kamrava, “Locked in a battle for succession and eager to 
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demonstrate relative independence from the US and to emphasize his Islamic credentials, 
one of Abdullah’s main goals was to improve relations with Iran.”180 Abdullah needed to 
balance internal and external threats, and believed that by reducing the American 
presence in the Gulf he could quell domestic opposition to his rule. Reducing Saudi 
reliance on America would also have the effect of improving relations with Iran. 
According to Joshua Teitelbaum: 
 For the Saudis, the goal is to get along in the neighborhood. If the United States 
cannot get rid of Saddam, then Saudi Arabia will have to make local 
arrangements, with Iran as an important partner, at least in the short term…For 
Iran, the goal is to counterbalance Iraq and get the United States out of the region. 
The kingdom still feels a threat from Tehran but needs Iran to coordinate oil 
production and contain Iraq.181  
 
Khatami as a symbol of rapprochement  
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran changed further with the election 
of Mohammad Khatami to the Iranian presidency in 1997. Al-Toraifi pointed out, 
“Despite efforts made by the Rafsanjani administration to open up to the world, Iran 
remained somewhat isolated, if not a pariah, in the world community.”182 Khatami won 
by a landslide because of a large youth and female voter turnout. Rafsanjani was not 
completely out of the political picture when it came to Saudi-Iranian relations, however; 
he had a significant role in Iranian foreign policy in his new post. He was now the head 
of the Expediency Council, which advises the Supreme Leader on foreign policy matters 
and helps in the development of that policy. Despite being depicted as an era of 
rapprochement, Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005) was marked by tension and mistrust 
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between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with neither side able to shake the images of the other 
that had developed during the evolution. Under Rafsanjani, relations between the two 
countries had begun to normalize, especially in the areas of trade, flights, and 
participation in the hajj. Khatami included several ministers from Rafsanjani’s 
administration into his administration, which “signaled a continuation and desire for 
consensus rather than radical change.”183 Although not new, “Khatami’s vision of a new 
state identity entailed that Iran no longer try to impose its normative views on the region, 
either by exporting revolutionary ideals or seeking to incite trouble in neighboring 
countries.”184 Khatami wanted to normalize relations with most countries, and tried to 
accomplish this through a “dialogue of civilizations.” Al-Toraifi noted, “He [Khatami] 
advocated the rejection of any unipolar form of international order and argued that the 
logic of dialogue was the only viable way to resolve differences between peoples and 
nations.”185  
During Khatami’s term in office, the Iranians and the Saudis signed two important 
agreements, the 1998 Cooperation Agreement and the 2001 Security Agreement. The 
Cooperation Agreement was signed to expand cultural, educational, communication, 
commercial, intelligence and security ties, and was subsequently expanded to include 
technical, industrial, transportation, environmental, investment, sports and tourism 
activities. The Security Agreement was, in al-Toraifi’s opinion, “the highest point of 
normalization between the two states” and “promised a new beginning for cooperation 
and trust building between the two former foes.”186 Although the Security Agreement 
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neither created a defense pact between the two countries, nor resolved the influence of 
foreign forces in the Gulf, it nevertheless, “addressed the Kingdom’s and Iran’s mutual 
resolve to end tensions in the Middle East.”187 The exact nature of the agreement is 
confidential, although the two countries did release a joint communiqué that laid out the 
goals of the agreement: cooperation in the areas of drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal 
immigration. Significantly, the agreement also pledged that each side would not interfere 
in the internal affairs of the other, and would respect each other’s national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.188 That concession was a huge jump in their relationship. Iran 
appeared to be excluding Saudi Arabia from the nations to which it desired to export its 
revolution. It did not, however, give up its desire to usurp Saudi Arabia’s status as the 
leader of the Islamic world; this was reflected in the fact that the agreement applied only 
to internal affairs of each country, and not to their positions on the global stage. The 
agreement was not a defense pact. While Iran wanted such an agreement, the Saudis were 
wary of such an arrangement and did not want to move away from reliance on the US. 
Simply put, Saudi Arabia was not ready to trust Iran at that level.189 
 
The impact of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy on bilateral relations 
The impact of the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Saudi-Iranian 
relations is the subject of some debate. Kamrava stated, “Ahmadi-Nejad’s (sic) election 
in 2005 may have brought back the gruff rhetorical style of Iranian diplomacy 
reminiscent of the earlier days of the Revolution, but it did not substantially change the 
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nature of Iranian-Saudi relations or the overall positive trend between the two.”190 Abdel 
al-Toraifi, Fahad Alsultan, and Pedram Saeid argued the contrary. All referred to his 
presidency as marking the deterioration of the relationship between the two states. 
Alsultan and Saeid remarked that Ahmadinejad’s presidency can be “characterized by the 
reorientation of the country’s foreign policy. The emphasis shifted from détente to more 
adventurous and conflict-ridden foreign policy that manifested hostility toward the 
United States and a fierce determination to acquire nuclear energy.”191 They continued, 
“Although Iran appeared to remain conciliatory toward Saudi Arabia, there were clear 
signs that it was expanding its influences from Iraq to the Levant and thus the two 
countries’ longstanding regional rivalry intensified.”192 Even though cracks in the 
relationship between Riyadh and Tehran were starting to reveal themselves after the fall 
of Saddam in 2003, Saudi Arabia congratulated Ahmadinejad on his victory in 2005. The 
Saudis had wanted Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad’s opponent, to return to power, expecting a 
continuation of the rapprochement Rafsanjani had initiated during his terms as president. 
The Saudis felt that the Iranians would want to continue with the progress that had been 
made during the previous administrations.193 Rafsanjani did stay on as head of the 
Expediency Council, however, and “was deemed still to be a significant figure in leading 
the two countries’ relations.”194 Furthermore, in his first press conference, Ahmadinejad 
stressed the need to continue on a peaceful path and build upon the relationship that 
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existed between Saudi Arabia and Iran.195 Initially, therefore, it appeared that 
Ahmadinejad wanted to continue on the path of rapprochement. 
Soon after his election, the Saudis invited Ahmadinejad to the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference in Mecca. This platform had in the past provided an opening for 
improving Saudi-Iranian relations. Khamenei insisted that Ahmadinejad accept the 
Saudis’ invitation and pledge Iran’s commitment to the rapprochement. However, 
Ahmadinejad used the conference to express a new direction in Iranian foreign policy. He 
addressed the conference and denounced the existence of Israel, adding that this scourge 
was aided by its imperialist overlords, the Americans.196 His speech was problematic 
because it projected an image contrary to the one the Saudis wanted for Islam. The 
conference was meant to show “the moderate face of Islam” not showcase Islam as a 
continuing threat to the world, particularly Israel.197  
But Ahmadinejad was redefining Iranian foreign policy, gravitating toward a 
discourse based on defiance and nationalism and hearkening back to the ideology present 
early in the revolution.198 His speech was meant to strike a chord with the Arab street, 
who were disgruntled over the Palestinian situation, and thus promote a Pan-Islamic 
agenda and exert influence over the region.199 By speaking directly to the Arab street, 
Ahmadinejad was hearkening back to rhetoric used under Khomeini, and was indirectly 
attempting to usurp Saudi Arabia’s role as the presumptive leader of the Muslim world. 
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Alsultan and Saeid described this phenomenon by saying, “Saudi Arabia had long aspired 
to be the champions of the Arab world. These remarks represented an attempt on the part 
of Iran to outmaneuver Saudi Arabia and other Arab rulers by hijacking the pan-Arab 
issue of support for Palestine.”200 However, Ahmadinejad was not interested in alienating 
the Saudis. Instead, he wanted to distance them from America’s influence and bring them 
closer to Iran. However, his speech did alienate the Kingdom, leading to real concerns 
over the new path in Iranian foreign policy. While the Saudis refrained from condemning 
his speech, Ahmadinejad’s appearance at the conference was the beginning of renewed 
tension between the two countries.  
While both countries attempted to downplay their differences, global events 
complicated their efforts. The toppling of Saddam’s regime in 2003 weakened Iraq, 
leaving its Shi’ite population ripe for manipulation by Iran. Saddam’s downfall allowed 
Iran to extend its influence in ways that had not been possible before. Additionally, 
Tehran was asserting its right as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to have 
civilian nuclear facilities. Outwardly, Saudi Arabia supported this right. At the same time, 
however, Riyadh did not fully trust its old rival, and became increasingly anxious about 
Iran’s nuclear capabilities. This mistrust manifested itself when Ahmadinejad was elected 
to a second term in 2009 in a hotly contested election. This time, the Saudis did not send 
congratulatory remarks.  
 
Conclusion 
After Khomeini’s death and the election of Rafsanjani, Iran’s foreign policy 
turned a corner. It moved away from openly advocating exportation of the revolution and 
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focused instead upon rebuilding its shattered infrastructure and economic ties. Iran sought 
to create a foreign policy more inclined to inclusion into the world at large. Much of 
Tehran’s success during this period can be attributed to the first president after the Iran-
Iraq War, Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani’s successor, Khatami, embraced Rafsanjani’s policies 
and perpetuated them. The groundwork laid by Rafsanjani is often overlooked, and most 
of the success in Saudi-Iranian relations is attributed to his immediate successor, 
Khatami. However, Rafsanjani’s part in the rapprochement must be acknowledged. The 
ascendance of Ahmadinejad may be seen as the beginning of the deterioration in relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, the troubles in Saudi-Iranian relations cannot 
be pinned solely on Ahmadinejad. Instead, external events such as the American 
intervention in Iraq also played a role in the demise of their relationship. The potential for 
Iran to exploit an Iraq without Saddam was foreseen in 1994 with the enactment of the 
American policy of dual containment.  After the fall of Baghdad, the Arab Spring became 
the next testing ground for Saudi-Iranian relations. The tension that mounted as a result 
did not initially sever relations as it had in 1988, but it did bring about new battlegrounds 
where the two countries engaged each other indirectly through proxies in attempts to 
assert dominance over the region.  
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CHAPTER 4  
ARENAS OF IRANIAN-SAUDI ENGAGEMENT: SYRIA AND IRAQ  
 
Since Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) have been on a trajectory toward reconciliation and a 
restoration of relations. However, relations were not normalized by any means, nor were 
they restored to the level that had existed before the creation of the IRI. The beginning of 
the end to this era of rapprochement began with the American intervention in Iraq in 
2003. The intervention did not stop the rapprochement, but it did stall the process.  
Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran approved of America’s intervention in Iraq. Iran 
was against any American involvement in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, conversely, did not 
fear American expansionism but rather feared a potential power vacuum that America’s 
intervention and Saddam’s removal from power would cause. Although Iran was not 
happy about America’s intervention into Gulf politics, the US did remove Iran’s long-
time enemy, which created the power vacuum feared by the Saudis. Saudi Arabia was 
fearful that Iran would take advantage of this vacuum, and because Iraq is 60% Shi’ite, 
Riyadh assumed that any Iraqi government would naturally be inclined to support Iran 
and its policies. The Saudis’ fear was soon to become a reality.  
About eight years later, as the US was preparing to leave Iraq, a series of protest 
movements erupted across the Middle East and North Africa. For the most part, Iran was 
supportive of these protests, seeing them as an extension of its revolution 30 years 
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earlier.201 It saw the movements not only as challenges to the region’s conservative, pro-
Western, governments, but also as Islamist in nature. Therefore, it believed that Islamic 
governments would replace authoritarian regimes.202 Mohsen Milani explained, “Iran 
enthusiastically supported the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain, dubbing 
them the ‘Islamic Awakening’ inspired by its own revolution.”203 On the one hand, they 
were supportive of the protests until protests occurred in Syria, Iran’s old and only Arab 
ally. Tehran was not prepared for the Syrian uprisings and hastily denounced them as 
being part of an American and Israeli conspiracy to depose the Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad.204 On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, overall, was against the Arab Spring, since 
the movement was in direct conflict with its support of the status quo in the region. For 
instance, Riyadh was actively involved in halting the protests in neighboring Bahrain. 
Under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Riyadh sent troops to bolster 
the al-Khalifas, the Bahraini ruling family. However, the Kingdom’s view of the protests 
in Syria was different. Instead of being against the protests, Riyadh called for Assad to 
capitulate to the will of the people and step down. Ana Echagüe said that Saudi Arabia 
saw the uprisings as an opportunity. She stated, “Riyadh saw the Arab uprisings as a 
challenge to regional stability but also as an opportunity to tip the scales against Iran. 
This led to a shift from its traditional cautious and conciliatory foreign and regional 
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policies towards a sharper affirmation of its interests.”205 She pointed out that this new 
level of assertiveness was not due to a new sense of self-confidence, but rather to a sense 
of vulnerability precipitated by the American intervention in Iraq and the power vacuum 
it created. Regional events also created a sense of being surrounded by instability from 
Bahrain to Yemen, and a fear that the sectarian nature of these conflicts would prompt 
Saudi Shi’a to rise up.206  
However, this fear ignores the policies that have disenfranchised the Shi’ite 
populations in the Gulf monarchies. These events were not triggered by sectarian 
grievances, but by an institutionalized repression that has favored certain groups over 
others. Benedetta Berti and Jonathan Paris pointed out, “The focus was not so much on 
sectarian demands but on calls for genuine social, economic, and political change,” 
stemming from “unequal development, corruption and center-periphery inequality.”207 
Milani argued:  
Sectarianism, or the co-called Sunni-Shia schism, is not the cause of this lingering 
cold war. The reality is that the two countries have been engaged in a relentless 
rivalry for power, or expansion of influence in the region, for decades. This is not 
to belittle the importance of sectarianism. Rather, it is to suggest that sectarianism 
is only one of the many tools at the disposal of the two countries for achieving 
their strategic goals. In this sense, sectarianism is not the cause of the cold war 
between the two countries; it is rather a symptom of the conflict.208  
Thus, the cause of the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not the result of the 
Shi’ite-Sunni divide which occurred around 700 C.E. Madawi al-Rasheed aptly 
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articulated, this reductionist assumption is a tool to obfuscate the present situation in 
these countries. She said, “The sectarian lens of the alleged Sunni-Shi’a divide obscures 
rather than illuminates complex realities on the ground.”209 The complexities on the 
ground are that both Tehran and Riyadh are exploiting this divide for their own 
aggrandizement and to deflect from the uncertainties that their regimes are facing. 
Furthermore, as Emile Hokayem argued, “While both have at times pursued non-
sectarian strategies, they have found their sectarian partners to be the most reliable and 
effective tools for projecting power.”210 Therefore, sectarianism as it has been argued is a 
means to attain power, if not through deflecting from domestic uncertainties, but also to 
garner supporters in their quests for power.  
The “two major battlegrounds” for this sectarian conflict are Iraq and Syria.211  
This interpretation of the conflicts as sectarian, however, is inaccurate. In Iraq and Syria, 
both Tehran and Riyadh are supporting sides that support their interests. These interests 
relate to their national security concerns, not an attempt to dominate the region through 
hegemonic aspirations. In Syria and Iraq, Iran is directly involved in fighting, rather than 
merely using other groups to fight on its behalf as is Saudi Arabia. Plus, the number of 
groups involved in the fighting is extensive and not all are beholden to a patron. Actors 
such as the Islamic State (IS) have their own agenda separate from the desires of both 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State, whose agenda is not in line with Tehran or 
Riyadh, threatens to topple the governments in Syria and Iraq, thus bringing the interests 
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of both the Kingdom and the Islamic Republic closer together. The Islamic State opposes 
both the monarchical Gulf governments and Shi’ite Iran. In the Islamic State, Tehran and 
Riyadh have found a common enemy. The question is whether this common enemy can 
bring them together and to what extent do they perceive it to be an existential threat. 
According to Hokayem, a reduction in tension between Riyadh and Tehran would 
improve the situation in Iraq and Syria, but it would not put an end to the violence.212 The 
collaboration between Riyadh and Tehran is unlikely given that “The kingdom seems to 
believe that Iran poses a much greater threat to the region than ISIS [the Islamic State] 
and other violent jiahdists,” despite evidence to the contrary.213 
 For instance, Christopher M. Blanchard pointed out, “IS leaders claim to have 
established a caliphate to which all pious Sunni Muslims owe allegiance, and they 
directly challenge the legitimacy of the Al Saud family, who have described themselves 
as the custodians of Islam’s holiest sites and rulers of a state uniquely built on and 
devoted to the propagation of Salafist interpretations of Sunni Islam.”214 As the Islamic 
State undermines al-Saud legitimacy, it has declared war on the Kingdom. For instance, 
“Since 2014, IS supporters have claimed responsibility for several attacks inside the 
kingdom, including attacks on security forces and Shia civilians.”215 Furthermore, “The 
aggressive expansion of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq and Syria and the group’s 
attacks inside Saudi Arabia raised Saudis’ level of concern about the group, and may be 
leading the Saudi government to seek stronger partnerships with the United States, select 
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Syrian opposition forces, Iraqi Sunnis and select regional countries,” but not with Iran.216 
Because, despite the Islamic State’s campaign against Saudi Arabia, Iran is still perceived 
to be a bigger threat. The Islamic State undermines the royal family’s legitimacy and tells 
its citizens that they owe allegiance to the Caliph, Abu Bakr Baghdadi, not to the corrupt 
Western-supporting al-Sauds. The Islamic State threatens Saudis’ domestic sphere, as 
well as their leadership of Muslims worldwide and in Arab affairs. Blanchard pointed to a 
particular incident in which “In May 2015, IS leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi aggressively 
challenged Saudi leaders’ credentials as defenders of Islam and implementers of Salafist 
Sunni principles, calling them, ‘the slaves of the Crusaders and allies of the Jews’ and 
accusing them of abandoning Sunni Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqis, and others.”217 Iran, on 
the other hand, is not denigrating the royal family and its place within Islam or within 
Arab affairs. But the Saudis, see the Islamic State as a manifestation of Iranian aggression 
against Sunnis and that by stopping Iran from engaging in conflicts across the Middle 
East, the Islamic State will disappear as they are a reaction to the atrocities perpetrated by 
Iran and its allies on Sunnis. The Saudis are blinded by their obsession with Iran and 
currently “see all regional politics through the lens of Iranian advances.”218 
 
Iraq and its place in the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical landscape  
For both Tehran and Riyadh, Baghdad represented a problem in that they had both 
dealt with Iraqi aggression in recent history.219 Neither country wanted a strong Iraq to 
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emerge after Saddam was toppled because a strong Iraq raised the specter of past Iraqi 
aggression. Instead, both Riyadh and Tehran wanted a puppet state, a nation that would 
go along with their policies and was not strong enough to impose its will upon the region. 
Unfortunately for the Kingdom, the likelihood that the new government in Baghdad 
would be pro-Saudi was remote. Saudi Arabia supported America’s attempts to rebuild 
the Iraqi government but hoped that the groups and people they had been supporting 
would be a part of the new regime. However, to Riyadh’s chagrin, those people that they 
had supported were former Ba’th Party members and, although they had fled Iraq and 
sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, Ba’th Party members were barred from participation in the 
new government by the Americans who controlled the Iraqi reconstruction process. 
Banafsheh Keynoush stated, “Riyadh expected these leaders to shape the new Iraq, and 
serve as a counterweight against the pro-Iranian Iraqi political parties.”220 Furthermore, 
the Saudis wanted the Ba’th Party members to be able to participate in the new 
government because “The party had challenged Iran over the past half century, and had 
helped contain the perceived Iranian Gulf hegemony that Arabs feared.”221 Although 
Riyadh wanted the new Iraqi government to include Ba’th members, Riyadh’s 
relationship with the Ba’th party was not simple. Riyadh had reservations despite wanting 
the members to be a part of the new government. Keynoush believed that Riyadh’s 
decision not to have an ambassador in Iraq since the Gulf War was designed to minimize 
its exposure and connections to the party. Even with these reservations, it still allowed its 
                                                 
220. Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?, 176. 
221. Ibid. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 78 
citizens to financially support Iraq and the Ba’ath party, despite international sanctions 
against the regime, which placed Riyadh in a precarious situation.222  
According to Kenneth Katzman, Ba’th Party members were excluded from the 
new government because of the fear that Shi’ites and Kurds would question not just the 
validity, but the prospects for democracy in Iraq if Ba’th Party members were allowed to 
participate in the new government.223 Most Ba’th Party members were Sunni, which 
would presumptively make them natural allies of Saudi Arabia. The problem was, as Eric 
Stover et al. suggested, “the Party had been virtually synonymous with Saddam Hussein’s 
regime and the brutality unleashed over its thirty-five years in power.”224 For the new 
government to foster inclusion among the Shi’a and Kurds and to have a semblance of 
democracy, the former Iraqi government officials had to be excluded, otherwise it would 
have had the air of returning the Iraqi government to the old repressive guard. The US 
government sought to appease the Shi’a and Kurds by banning Ba’th Party members 
from any participation in the new government or army. Riyadh criticized the American 
decision as it removed tens of thousands of people with government experience from ever 
being able to participate in their new government.  
Despite having a vested interest in the new Iraq, Saudi Arabia kept its distance 
and refused to participate militarily or politically in rebuilding Iraq. Its focus was 
humanitarian aid and hosting conferences that promoted reconciliation between the 
various Iraqi factions. Another issue was the $28 billion debt that Iraq owed Saudi Arabia 
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and private Saudi financiers mainly from funding Baghdad’s protracted conflict with 
Iran. Blanchard pointed out that “Saudi Arabia’s principal interests with regard to Iraq 
are: first, to prevent instability and conflict in Iraq from threatening Saudi Arabia’s 
internal security and stability; second, to prevent the repression of Iraq’s Sunnis by newly 
dominant Shiites; and third, to limit the regional influence of a potentially hostile 
Iran.”225  
Instead of having helped to rebuild Iraq, Riyadh is speculated to have financially 
supported the Sahwa, Awakening Movement, among the Iraqi Sunnis who were a part of 
the insurgency against the American presence in Iraq.226 Whether the government was 
funding them is unknown, but many individual Saudis had been supporting the 
movement through donations or volunteering to fight despite several Saudi clerics 
denouncing such activity.227 In spite of increased border security, many Saudis (an 
undeterminable sum) had been crossing into Iraq to fight. Their participation was a 
security risk to the Kingdom, as returned fighters from other conflicts have committed 
acts of terrorism in Saudi Arabia.228 Also, the empowerment of Iraqi Shi’a had led to 
tension within the Kingdom between the Saudi Shi’a and the government, leading to 
demonstrations. 
Many of the Saudi worries mentioned by Blanchard have come to fruition, 
especially the worry about Iraq becoming heavily influenced by Iran. Turki al-Faisal said 
that because of Iran’s influence in Iraq, “this is the major reason we [Saudi Arabia] 
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continue to maintain the same distance from all Iraqi factions.”229 Riyadh maintains this 
distance on the belief that those involved in the government are working, not on the 
behalf of all Iraqis be they Sunni, Shi’ite, Kurdish or other, but as Iranian surrogates. This 
is one of the reasons al-Faisal said that Riyadh had not opened up an embassy in Iraq 
because “we [Saudi Arabia] still have serious and deep-seated reservations about the 
formation of the current Iraqi government, we are the only country not to have sent a 
resident ambassador to Iraq.”230 Although Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic ties with Iraq 
in 2004, it did so with trepidation and did not reestablish an embassy in Iraq until 
December 2015.231 Blanchard remarked that this was the beginning of resumption of 
normal relations between the two countries spurred on by the removal of Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his replacement by Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi. The 
Saudis saw Maliki as an Iranian lackey, “a sectarian figure who hinders reconciliation 
among Iraqi communities,” according to W. Andrew Terrill.232 Blanchard stated, “Saudi 
leaders viewed Maliki as unduly influenced by Iran and have appeared willing to engage 
Abadi in pursuit of better bilateral relations and in support of more inclusion of Iraq’s 
Sunnis by Baghdad.”233 This is not to say that Riyadh did not try to garner the favor of 
Maliki. King Abdullah invited him to Riyadh to discuss the formation of the Iraqi 
government in 2010 because Riyadh feared that its behavior was pushing the Iraqi 
government closer to Iran.  
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Before the 2010 election, Saudi Arabia had favored and funded another candidate 
for Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, who although Shi’ite, was secular and open to 
including Sunni factions within his government.234 Even though al-Faisal had said that 
Riyadh had distanced itself from all factions in Iraq, according to Wehrey:  
Nevertheless, Riyadh is hedging its bets by backing an array of Sunni groups; it 
has long-standing links to the Iraqi Islamic Party, the former officer corps of 
Iraq’s army, and Salafist groups. Regarding Shiite parties, Riyadh has seen the 
utility of backing nationalist actors in the south, such as Fadhila, as a 
counterweight to Iran, and of using tribal intermediaries who have both Shiite and 
Sunni branches, such as Shammar.235  
According to Keynoush, Riyadh supported a wide range of Ba’th members, be they Sunni 
or Shi’ite. It also sought to sow a sense of Arab nationalism among the Iraqi to unite 
them. She stated:  
The ascendency of Shi’is to power in Iraq remained a secondary concern to 
Riyadh’s decisionmakers who had long worked with and supported Shi’i political 
figures within the Baath Party hierarchy…In principle, it therefore did not oppose 
the prospect of Shi’i leadership in Iraq as long as Sunni Iraqis were not 
sidelined.236  
 They believed that the inclusion of Sunni members would prevent Iraq from completely 
falling under Iranian influence because the Sunnis would serve as a buffer against the 
aspirations of the Shi’ite members of government.  
However, the Kingdom’s actions mirrored those of Iran. Tehran supported 
different Shi’ite and even Kurdish groups, both financially and militarily.237 By 
supporting multiple options, Iran was looking to hedge it bets and benefit from fostering 
the development of the new Iraqi government, one that was neither too strong nor 
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fractured. Ray Takeyh stated, “Tehran fears that the insurgency and even the democratic 
process itself may lead to the fragmentation of Iraq into three independent and unstable 
entities.”238 A fractured Iraq in the midst of civil war could spill over into Iran, causing 
chaos. Therefore, Iran wants Iraq’s territorial integrity to remain intact. According to 
Takeyh, “Iran would prefer the Iraqi state to remain intact, although weakened and 
divided against itself.”239 Iran fears that a strong Iraq would be a threat to the Islamic 
Republic, no matter whether a Sunni or Shi’ite was in charge.240 Thus, Iran preferred a 
politically and militarily weak Iraq, but one strong enough to resist splintering. 
For Keynoush, Iran was in a bind, as it did not want a weak neighbor nor a strong 
one either. She mentioned: 
The safety of Iran’s borders was best guaranteed if power in Iraq was shared 
among multiple groups, and ideally if Baghdad was run by Shi’i factions with 
varying political orientations, to allow Iran to influence them more easily to 
secure their compliance in facing any potentially hostile trends against Tehran. In 
other words, a weak government in Baghdad was undesirable, but so was one led 
by a strong man even if a Shi’i.241  
This point is echoed by Alireza Nader: “Iran’s policy of maintaining influence in Iraq is 
to form Shi’a-led centralized governments while making sure they do not become too 
powerful. Thus, Iranian influence is strong within the central government and among 
non-governmental actors that challenge central authority.”242 It was important that the 
government was run by the majority Shi’ite population, but it did not need to be a 
theocracy like Iran. One point that both authors stress is that the government needed to be 
weak, but not so weak that Iraq broke into separate parts. It was not a given that a Shi’ite-
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led government would necessarily be friendly to Iran, because many Shi’ites are wary of 
Iranian influence in Iraq’s government.  Many Iraqi political groups were not only 
fostered by Iran, but fought alongside Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. However, they were 
suspicious of Iranian influence in Iraq’s government. Those Iraqi Shi’a who had sought 
refuge in Iran during the Saddam era, had over the last decade, distanced themselves from 
Iran to appeal to a wider base and to prevent the semblance of any undue influence from 
Iran.243 In spite of this distancing, Iran had helped empower the Shi’a of Iraq and had 
maneuvered the various political and militia groups like chess pieces. It had convinced 
the different Iraqi Shi’ite groups to band together to form coalitions to strengthen their 
position in Iraq’s parliamentary system.  
These aspects are all a part of Iran’s policy toward Iraq, which, according to 
Nader includes a three-point strategy of religious influence, arbitration between and 
unification of Iraqi political groups, and support for Shi’ite non-governmental militias.244 
Tehran has been more active than Riyadh in cultivating partnerships. Terrill pointed out, 
“This Iranian effort has involved diplomacy, economic development, covert action, and 
cultivating Iranian clients within the Iraqi political system including the leadership of 
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armed militias. This approach has produced results, and Iran has emerged as a major 
power in domestic Iraqi politics.”245  
 Nader admits that there is a bond between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’a, but notes that 
this bond does not lend itself to creating the kind of influence Iran would like to have in 
Iraq. Tehran, therefore, tries to increase the bond through soft power activities.246 For 
one, Tehran is trying to foster the next generation of Shi’ite clerics to be more in tune 
with the Islamic Republic and its form of theocracy. As of 2006, the majority of the 
world’s Shi’ite population followed the teachings of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, based in 
Najaf, Iraq.247 His ideas and desires have an effect on the amount of influence Iran has in 
Iraq. He is not an advocate of Iran’s governing ideology, the rule of the jurisprudent. 
Although active in the Iraqi political sphere, he does not believe that the clergy should 
play as significant a role in government as they do in Iran. Instead, he wants Iraq to have 
a pluralistic government inclusive of its various religious sects.248 He is in his mid-60s 
and Iran is not looking to replace him, but is rather looking to the future and wants to 
have a hand in choosing his successor.249 Besides cultivating Sistani’s successor, Iran is 
engaged in other soft power activities, such as involvement in public works like building 
clinics, schools, and mosques around Iraq.250 
 As mentioned earlier, Iran played a significant role in Iraqi politics. It opened an 
embassy in Baghdad in 2003, and has consulates in Basra, Erbil, Karbala, Najaf, and 
Sulaymaniyah. According to Michael Eisenstadt, the way Iran asserts influence in Iraq is 
                                                 
245. Terrill, The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security, 48.  
246. Ibid. 
247. Ibid., 4. 
248. Ibid., 3. 
249. Ibid., 4. 
250. Ibid. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 85 
through its embassy and consulates.251 Both of the successive Iranian ambassadors to Iraq 
since the fall of Saddam, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi and current ambassador Hassan Danaifar, 
have also been members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) elite Qods 
Force.252 According to Nader, this is important because the Qods Force commander, 
Qassem Soleimani, has been influential in bringing different Iraqi factions together. He 
says, “He heads all of Iran’s activities in Iraq, including overseeing Shi’a militias, 
disbursing funds to political leaders, and overseeing ‘soft power’ activities.”253 Soleimani 
has ties to all the major sects in Iraq: Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’a. Nader also points out that 
he has been instrumental in “nearly all major Iraqi government deliberations since the fall 
of Saddam.”254 He recounts Soleimani’s escapades during the 2006 and 2010 Iraqi 
parliamentary elections. In 2006, Soleimani reportedly slipped into the Green Zone and 
met with Iraqi officials to broker Maliki’s premiership and, in 2010, he convinced the 
Kurds and Shi’a to come together to support Maliki over Allawi. Their union enabled 
Maliki to retain his position despite the fact that Allawi’s coalition won a plurality of 
parliament seats.255 In 2014, Soleimani was still a Maliki supporter, but there was 
international pressure to remove Maliki from power. Maliki was believed to be 
promoting a sectarian agenda. This time, it was a member of Iran’s National Security 
Council, Ali Shamkhani, not Soleimani, who orchestrated the transition from Maliki to 
Abadi.256 Despite US support for Abadi and his pledge to be more inclusive toward the 
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Sunnis, Iran decided to support Abadi as well once it became apparent that continued 
support for Maliki was fruitless and his tenure as prime minister was tenuous. Therefore, 
it can be argued that in order to remain relevant in Iraqi politics, Iran decided to support 
Abadi.  
To manipulate the Iraqi political situation in other ways, Iran also supported non-
governmental militias that can pressure the government to enact policies favorable to 
Iran. Eisenstadt noted that supporting Shi’ite militias was Tehran’s initial focus, which 
subsequently expanded to include support for Sunni militias as well.257 It has also 
supported Kurdish militias in the past.258 Iran supported a myriad of militias because, as 
Nader pointed out, there was no single group that fulfilled all of Iran’s needs.259 Tehran 
funded, equipped and trained these militias. Militia members traveled to Iran to receive 
training in dedicated camps. Members of the IRGC and Hezbollah also trained the 
militias in Iraq. Similar to its approach to the Iraqi central government, Iran did not want 
these militias to be too strong. Inevitably, when a group becomes strong enough to field a 
political party to appeal to a wide base, it needs to distance itself from its Iranian 
benefactors.260 Therefore, Tehran was seeding and feeding multiple militias from 
different sectors of Iraqi society to have numerous avenues by which to affect Iraq and, in 
turn, protect itself. Interestingly, Iran’s position in Iraq is also beneficial for its Syria 
policy. Conversely, its policy for Syria has direct implications for its relationship with 
Iraq.  
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The different strategies employed by Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian Civil War  
 
Syria has been an Iranian ally since the Islamic Revolution and was one of two 
lone Arab states to support Iran in its war with Iraq during the 1980s.261 Syria and Iran 
share common interests such as Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the Palestinians, common 
enemies, like Israel and Iraq, and a distrust for the US. Syria is also run by the minority 
Alawites whose faith, although not exactly similar to Iran’s Twelver Shi’ism, is also 
derived from Shi’ism. The Syrian-Iranian bond is held together by mutual strategic 
interests. Unsurprisingly, Syria’s relationship with Iran has impacted the relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Syria. Syria has inevitably aligned itself with Iran throughout 
the Islamic Republic’s history. Iran supported former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s 
because of his permissive attitude toward policies enacted by Iran to prop up the Assad 
regime in Syria. First and foremost, Maliki allowed transport of weapons through Iraq 
into Syria following Syria’s fall into civil war.262 One of the reasons Maliki permitted this 
policy is because Iraq, like Iran, sees Syria as an ally, at least since the civil war broke 
out.  
Prior to the Syrian Civil War, Iraq and Syria had a contentious relationship, which 
began with different Ba’th ruling parties in control of each country. After the fall of 
Saddam, Iraq accused Syria of harboring al-Qaeda members along with former Iraqi 
Ba’th Party members who opposed Maliki’s government. The members of the two groups 
had been traversing Syria and Iraq’s porous borders “where they funnel personnel, arms, 
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and funds over the border to fighters inside Iraq.”263 The presence of al-Qaeda and 
members of the Iraqi Ba’th Party in Syria hindered bilateral cooperation, despite both 
states being an ally of Iran. However, as the Syrian regime became threatened by Sunni 
jihadists also plaguing Iraq, Damascus and Baghdad became allies. Hayder al-Khoei 
described the situation in which Damascus and Baghdad grew closer together: 
Having previously been seen as a threat to Maliki’s rule, Assad, faced now with a 
Sunni-dominated and regionally backed uprising, emerged as a natural ally and 
bulwark against that same hostile Sunni block…The Iraqi government now 
believes that a victory for the rebels in Syria will mean not just a post-Assad 
neighbour (sic) under the influence of hostile Gulf forces intent on destabilising 
(sic) Maliki’s rule, but also a resurgent al-Qaeda at home.264 
Terrill also made a similar point about Iraqi Shi’ite fears of Assad being replaced by a 
Sunni government friendly toward Sunni jihadists in Iraq and hostile to Iraq’s Shi’ite-led 
government.265 Iraq’s fears are coming true as the civil war in Syria spreads to Iraq 
because jihadists in both countries have been working together.266 Furthermore, the 
establishment of a hostile regime in Syria and its potential for spill-over are also among 
Iran’s fears, and Tehran has been working with Russia to do everything possible to 
prevent such an occurrence, and to prevent the Assad regime from disintegrating.  
Supporting Assad has created a situation from which Iran cannot easily extricate 
itself. Iran began to send advisors to help quell the protests in 2011. Tehran even 
counseled Assad to implement reforms and talk with opposition groups, and allow them 
limited participation in the government. But Assad balked at this idea, and preferred to 
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unleash massive amounts of force on the uprising to discourage any further dissention. 
When this approach failed, Iran sent weapons and volunteers to train, advise, and fight. 
Terrill discussed Iran’s involvement in Syria and stated: 
Iranian military support for the Asad (sic) regime then rapidly expanded in fields 
such as training, advising, and intelligence gathering and analysis. Iran has also 
provided badly needed financial support to the Syrian regime, which has allowed 
it to keep its military largely intact despite significant desertions early in the 
conflict and to provide for the economic needs of loyalists.267  
Iran has proven adept at convincing Shi’a from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq to 
volunteer and fight in Syria. Hezbollah had also been instrumental, not just in fighting, 
but in advising and training Syrian fighters. Hezbollah did not have to be pushed into 
supporting Assad, as Syria has supported Hezbollah over the years and assisted in the 
transport of weapons from Iran, through Syria, to Hezbollah.  
Unlike Iran’s policy on Iraq, which is based on national security concerns, 
Tehran’s Syria policy is not just about national security, but also encompasses Iran’s 
ability to project power and influence throughout the Middle East.268 Juban Goodarzi said 
that, should a regime change occur in Syria, “Iran would lose not only an important Arab 
ally, but also its ability to provide support for Hezbollah, curtailing its influence in 
Lebanon and over the Arab-Israeli question.”269 Because Syria shares a border with 
Lebanon, Tehran uses Damascus to transport weapons and advisors into Lebanon for 
Hezbollah. Syria borders Israel and Lebanon. For Terrill: 
If the Iranians lose their influence over Syria, it is also uncertain how they will 
transfer weapons and equipment to Hizbullah (sic) in Lebanon. Syria is the main 
transit point for such arms and largely irreplaceable in this role. It is possible that 
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Iran would attempt to supply Hezbollah forces by sea, but they have had 
difficulties with this approach in the past.270  
Hezbollah is used as a defense against or retaliation for any possible Israeli or American 
incursion into Iran, as Hezbollah’s strategic position in Lebanon allows it to attack Israel 
(although not without repercussions). This ability also allows Hezbollah to be an element 
in Iran’s support for the Palestinians, and thus works as both offense and defense. If 
Assad is removed and replaced, it is possible that his replacement would be less open to 
assisting Tehran in fostering Hezbollah’s capabilities against Israel.271 Therefore, 
supporting Assad is a way of protecting both Hezbollah and Iran’s foreign policy 
interests in terms of Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian issue is very important to the 
Iranians because they “derive enormous prestige and legitimacy—both domestically and 
regionally—from being seen as patrons of the Palestinian cause.”272 
Iran sees the toppling of Assad as a potential domino effect that could have 
internal implications, starting with replacement by a Sunni-led government that could be 
inimical to Iran and more willing to work with other Arab states over Iran. Along with 
working with other Arab states, it is possible that a post-Assad Syrian state would be 
willing to work with the US. Also, Assad’s fall could affect Iraq, as Sunni jihadists in 
Syria and Iraq band together and develop alliances. According to Goodarzi, “This would 
have major security implications for Iran and could produce enormous internal problems, 
especially in the Kurdish and Arab-inhabited regions of the country bordering Iraq.”273 
Also, it is believed in Iranian power circles that the toppling of Assad would allow 
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foreign interests to press for regime change in Iran.274 Furthermore, a Syrian civil war 
could engulf the entire region in a sectarian civil war and the vacuum created by toppling 
Assad could create a failed state and terrorist safe haven.275 Milani pointed out, “Today, 
Syria has become the center of gravity for an assorted array of Jihadist and terrorist 
organizations…If Assad falls, it is very unlikely that these Jihadist and terrorist 
organizations will leave Syria. They will likely challenge any post-Assad government to 
impose their rule.”276 
Iran wanted a say in deciding Syria’s fate because there was a great deal at stake 
for Iran. Tehran would not allow Syria to become an enemy, and it knew that if Assad did 
remain in power he would be indebted to Iran. However, Iran was not wedded to Assad 
remaining in power.277 It wants the structure that exists to remain; this means retaining 
security and armed forces personnel, but allowing a power-sharing agreement between 
the Alawites and non-jihadist opposition groups. But it quickly became clear to those in 
Iran that “Assad was the regime…The organisation (sic) of the Syrian state, based on 
assabiyyah, or kinship, made it impossible to remove him and his top lieutenants while 
keeping the system in place…Most, importantly, powerful constituencies in Tehran saw 
Assad as an indispensable ally, and equated Syria’s security with Iran’s security.”278 
Tehran feared wholesale change and reorientation of Syria’s government and military.279 
Thus, Iran had been instrumental in helping Syria get around sanctions and extending 
credit to help prop up its economy. Despite facing its own economic difficulties, Iran had 
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spent billions of dollars to support Assad.280 Although the exact amount of money is 
unclear, experts have debated that, as of 2015, the amount was between $6 and $20 
billion dollars spent annually to support the regime through lines of credit, oil transfers, 
military personnel (Iranian and other militias) and subsidies for weapons.281 It had also 
rallied supporters, most notably Iraq. In the end, Assad has become completely reliant on 
Iran. This situation may or may not be Iran’s desire. Iran does need Assad, or some 
version of him, in power to maintain its influence in the region.  
Early in the conflict, the exact nature of the Syrian-Saudi relationship was 
unclear, as were Saudi Arabia’s interests in the Syrian Civil War. Riyadh was on the 
fence when it came to the removal of Assad from power. Although it would not mind if 
Iran lost one of its key allies and its ability to project power in the region, the toppling of 
a government goes against Saudi foreign policy, which strongly supports the status quo. 
Terrill said: 
Riyadh almost certainly would not view the situation in Syria as an unqualified 
Saudi victory, even if the Assad regime was overthrown and replaced by an anti-
Iranian government. The Saudi leadership remains ultra-conservative, and 
correspondingly takes a dim view of birth revolutionary turmoil and Arab 
democracy. A strong, vibrant Syrian democracy would at least be a serious 
inconvenience for Riyadh, and it could emerge as a real challenge to the Middle 
Eastern status quo.282  
However, Saudi Arabia’s stance has since changed because as Milani stated: 
Riyadh is determined to overthrow Assad and bring to power a Riyadh-friendly 
regime willing to terminate its strategic cooperation with Iran and disallow Tehran to 
use Damascus as a reliable conduit to transfer money and weapons to Hezbollah. 
And, perhaps most importantly, Riyadh seems to believe that a friendly Syria would 
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provide the kingdom with a backdoor reentry into Iraq with the ultimate goal of 
undermining a Tehran-friendly government in Baghdad.283 
Riyadh has condemned Hezbollah as a terrorist organization through use of group 
condemnation by the GCC which issued a statement accusing Hezbollah of “carrying out 
‘hostile acts’ in the six GCC member-states and engaging in campaigns of ‘terror and 
incitement’ in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.”284 These campaigns of terror and incitement are 
believed to be at the behest of or in coordination with Iran.285  Furthermore, Riyadh’s 
desire to see Assad overthrown is departure from previous Saudi foreign policy, which 
has been in the past a staunch supporter of the status quo. 
Initially Riyadh was silent about the Syrian uprisings, neither approving nor 
disapproving of them. Its caution was intended to prevent more uprisings and the 
overthrow of additional governments in the region. Eventually, though, the Kingdom 
condemned the Syrian government’s harsh crackdown on the protesters and recalled its 
ambassador—an action that was followed by other Gulf monarchies—and urged Assad to 
implement reforms. In a written statement, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia said “‘What is 
happening in Syria is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia…Syria should think wisely before 
it's too late and issue and enact reforms that are not merely promises but actual 
reforms.’”286 Hokayem saw this statement as “a radical shift in Gulf policy in favour (sic) 
of regime change,” although the king had not called upon regime change.287  
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The change in Saudi strategy regarding Syria was due to the Saudi people’s 
overwhelming support for the Syrian protesters.288 Riyadh recalled its ambassador to 
Damascus to quell public outrage over Syria’s strong crackdown on protesters.289 Saudi 
Arabia followed this move by pushing for sanctions against Syria in the Arab League to 
isolate and undermine the Assad regime. Saudi Arabia initially had not gone as far as to 
call for Assad’s removal, instead attempting to co-opt Syria. When Syria rejected Saudi 
overtures, Saudi Arabia began openly supporting the opposition to the Syrian regime. 
Removing Assad became vital to Saudi Arabia as a means of countering the loss of Iraq 
to Iran. Turki al-Faisal described Iran’s activities as having a level of malevolence that 
needed to be curbed. He stated, “Their [Iran’s] invasion of Syria is underway and 
growing. This must end. Saudi Arabia will oppose any and all of Iran’s interference and 
meddling in other countries.”290 He further pointed out that Iran had no business 
meddling in the affairs of any state, especially not an Arab state.291  
Although Assad’s removal would not restore balance in the Gulf to the level that 
Riyadh sought, it would nevertheless be a good starting point. Hassan Hassan noted that 
“Gulf leaders believe that a new—Sunni—regime in Damascus will naturally ally itself 
with the Gulf states at Iran’s expense, particularly if they have helped establish the new 
order through financial and military support.”292 Syria’s population is almost three-
quarters Sunni and as such Riyadh assumed that based on population size, the Sunnis will 
come to power. It is reasonable to conclude that the new Syrian regime would be more 
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inclined to support, or even to follow, Riyadh’s lead on regional issues. Also, cutting 
Iran’s access to Syria would prevent it from being able to actively support Hezbollah and 
have influence in Lebanese politics and in the Palestinian issue. Hassan goes on to make 
an assumption that the Gulf States believed that supporting a Sunni regime in Syria 
would help their standing in Iraq because a Sunni Syrian state could strengthen the 
Sunnis in Iraq.293 With this realignment, the regional balance of power would sway back 
in favor of the Gulf Sunni monarchies, a position that was lost with the fall of Saddam.  
Although returning the regional balance of power back toward the Sunni Gulf 
monarchies was a key goal, the monarchies disagreed on how to achieve this goal. The 
two key players, Riyadh and Doha, supported different opposition factions. Instead of the 
Gulf States banding together against their common foe, Iran, their differences have 
hindered the Syrian opposition.294 Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood and 
jihadists in an attempt to topple the Assad regime. Saudi Arabia, however, has been more 
cautious regarding who it supports and is not eager for Assad to be replaced by jihadists 
whose motives are in opposition to the Kingdom’s.295 Riyadh is suspicious of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood that Qatar supports because the Brotherhood’s radical ideology advocates a 
level of change unacceptable to the Kingdom. Instead, Riyadh has backed Western allied 
non-Islamists, secularists, nationalists, and non-radical Salafists.  
At first, Riyadh advocated complete regime change through military means, but 
changed its position once it became clear that the West was not interested in being 
actively involved militarily and that the forces taking control in Syria were the jihadists 
who Saudi Arabia actively opposes.296 Despite financing a variety of opposition groups, 
Saudi Arabia has stopped short of funding the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-
Qaeda affiliate) mainly because both groups despise the Saudis. Gause maintained, “Both 
groups despise the Saudis, in part because of their close ties to the United States and in 
part because official Saudi clerics regularly condemn the groups for their ‘deviations’ 
from the true path.”297 The Kingdom had also enacted measures to prevent its citizens 
from financially contributing to these groups, declaring them terrorist organizations in 
2014 and insisting that financial contributions go through official channels. Saudi Arabia 
had taken steps to prevent financing or associating with these groups both in Saudi 
Arabia and abroad by punishing such activities with lengthy prison sentences. 
Unlike the Iranians, the Saudis lacked the infrastructure to properly support the 
opposition. Saudi Arabia provided financial support only, and even then, through hastily 
formed groups. It lacked the ability to provide military support in the form of training or 
intelligence gathering. Their support was not enough to tilt the balance. Hokayem pointed 
out, “Injections of weaponry into the battlefield at times translated into military advances, 
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but were not regular enough to overcome Assad’s military superiority.”298 Additionally, 
Hokayem stated, “Rebel groups behaved opportunistically, seeking support from any 
quarter and changing loyalties when needed.”299 Saudi Arabia, unlike Iran, also had limits 
placed on which groups it could support by Western States with which Riyadh had a 
complicated relationship. Western States monitored Saudi financing of Syrian opposition 
and determined the criteria of whom could be given assistance based on “ideological and 
religious orientation; battlefield behaviour (sic); relations with the political opposition, 
civilians and radical actors; managerial competence; and accountability.”300 By contrast, 
Iran did not put limits on the groups it supported.  
 
A resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and possible areas of 
cooperation  
 
The likelihood that Iran and Saudi Arabia will coordinate efforts to fight their 
mutual enemy, the Islamic State, is remote. The relationship between the two is strained 
to the point that Saudi Arabia opposes Iran’s participation in negotiations regarding 
Syria. Riyadh is exploiting the sectarian nature of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq to its 
advantage to diminish Tehran’s perceived success in gaining power in the region. In 
reality, Riyadh has not been marginalized, but the perception is that Tehran has gained 
status at Riyadh’s expense. Iran sees the existence of the Islamic State as the result of 
Saudi soft power of funding and establishing Wahhabi mosques and schools worldwide, 
but Saudi Arabia sees the Islamic State’s existence as a part of the repression of Sunnis 
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by the Iraqi and Syrian regimes.301 The sectarian nature of the conflicts hurts both Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. It hurts Iran because Iran wants to be perceived as representing all 
Muslims, not just the Shi’a. It hurts Saudi Arabia because, although Riyadh has been 
exploiting the sectarian rift, it cannot combat the Islamic State without appearing to be 
persecuting its fellow Sunnis, something that could generate domestic troubles.  
Riyadh is incapable of finding a satisfactory solution to the current conflicts on its 
own. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran is implementing a long-term strategy, not only to 
safeguard its regional interests but also to defend itself from the same jihadists plaguing 
both Syria and Iraq. Iran’s reliance on Shi’ite militias in both countries has increased the 
sectarian nature of both conflicts, and added to Sunni dissatisfaction and greater support 
for jihadists. In Iraq, Shi’ite militias perpetrate atrocities against Sunnis, and in Syria, the 
Alawite government engages in violent acts that also garner Sunni support for the 
jihadists. Saudi Arabia is reassessing its Syria strategy, trying to decide which is more 
disagreeable, Assad remaining in power and assisting Iran’s rise, or the rise of jihadists. 
Iran believes that Assad is necessary to fight against the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia, 
however, finds both possibilities—the ascendance of the Islamic State and Assad 
remaining in power—threatening to its sovereignty. If the Islamic State gains in power, 
there could be internal disturbances within Saudi Arabia. The royal family has already 
adopted massive economic reforms to placate its citizens. It also has cracked down on 
political agitation, imprisoning scores of people to eliminate any possible threat to the 
royal family.  
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Since 2015, Iran worked with Russia to oust the Islamic State from Syria and Iraq. 
Saudi Arabia has also done its part by participating in air strikes led by a US coalition of 
forces in Syria. Riyadh has likewise sent 30,000 troops to its border with Iraq to guard 
against any infiltration by the Islamic State. However, cooperating with Iran is not 
plausible for Saudi Arabia, at least not at this juncture. Just like the US, Saudi Arabia is 
not willing to partner with Iran in ridding the area of the Islamic State. However, the US 
does acknowledge that Iran’s efforts further American objectives even if they are not 
willing to cooperate in these efforts.302 If the US were to cooperate with Iran, Saudi 
Arabia might see the benefit of also doing so. However, cooperating with Iran does not 
require a push from Washington. Saudi Arabia needs to realize that “an effort to 
accommodate reasonable Iranian interests in the gulf (sic) should not be mistaken for an 
American tilt toward Tehran.”303 Nor should such a move be seen as an abandoment of 
Saudi Arabia in favor of Iran. Instead, the move should be seen as an effort to thwart a 
common enemey shared by all three states.   However, to accomplish this goal requires a 
reorientation in Saudi priorities, away from the fear of Iranian hegemony and toward an 
emphasis on regime survival.  Milani pointed out that Saudi Arabia sees itself in a bind. 
He stated: 
At the same time, the rise of ISIS has been both a blessing and a potential danger 
for Saudi Arabia. It has been a blessing because ISIS is anti-Shiite, anti-Iran... It is 
also a potential danger for Saudis because ISIS seeks to create a caliphate whose 
heart would be Mecca in Saudi Arabia. This Janus-faced quality of ISIS explains 
the Saudis’ reluctance to seriously engage in the U.S. coalition to defeat ISIS.304 
The reorientation of Saudi Arabia to be engaged in cooperation with the US and Iran is 
only a possibility if the Kingdom realizes the threat that the Islamic State poses. The 
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Islamic State is not just a countering to perceived Iranian aggression but a threat to Saudi 
stability and territorial integrity. This risk is currently not strong enough for Saudi Arabia 
to act. However, neither is the threat that the Islamic State poses strong enough for Iran to 
cooperate with Saudi Arabia.  For its part, the US was no longer interested in Assad’s 
removal but was more interested in fighting terrorism. Gause pointed out, “The Obama 
administration’s top priority in the region is rolling back and ultimately destroying Salafi 
jihadist groups-above all, ISIS and al Qaeda. These groups may not represent an 
existential threat to the United States, but they do pose an immediate danger to the 
country and its allies.”305 
  
                                                 
305. Gause, “The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations,” 116. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 101 
CHAPTER 5  
IRANIAN NUCLEAR AMBITIONS AND THE SAUDI REACTION  
 
Against the backdrop of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the rising threat of the 
Islamic State lies the potential of a nuclear-armed Iran. Just like the Syrian and Iraqi 
conflicts, a nuclear Iran divides Riyadh and Tehran. Iran, as a signatory to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, believes it has the right to nuclear energy. The NPT 
was the brainchild of President Dwight Eisenhower, and was designed to quell the spread 
of nuclear weapons, but also to allow the world to benefit from the civilian applications 
of the technology. The United Nations adopted the NPT in 1968 to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons based on the belief that their proliferation could lead to a nuclear war.  
Iran’s belief in its right to nuclear technology is rooted in Article IV of the NPT 
which grants the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.”306 
Iran says that as signatory to the NPT it has the right to develop a nuclear program. The 
Shah signed the treaty in 1970 and with American support pursued nuclear technology. 
Although Iran’s government changed 9 years later and it became inimical rather than 
friendly to the West, it was still a signatory to the treaty. Iran maintains that its nuclear 
program is for peaceful purposes, such as nuclear energy and medical isotopes. However, 
there is fear that its research and development extend beyond these areas and that Iran 
will use this technology to develop a nuclear weapon. The future of Iran’s nuclear 
program is unclear as attested to by the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The 
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NIE stated that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 due to intense 
international pressure, and therefore did not currently have a nuclear weapons program. 
The NIE went on to further state that the future of this program could not be 
determined.307  
This uncertainty when it comes to the exact nature of Iran’s nuclear program leads 
Saudi Arabia to fear that the real motivation behind Iran’s nuclear program is to develop 
a bomb one day. Riyadh views Iran’s program as a part of Tehran’s bid to become the 
dominant power in the Gulf. According to Fahad M. Alsultan and Pedram Saeid, “A 
nuclear Iran would be a nightmare for Saudi Arabia. Even the suspicion of Iran 
acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, regardless of the reality, would change the 
regional balance of power in Iran’s favour (sic).”308 In response to Iran’s nuclear 
program, Riyadh has become more vociferous in its desire to have similar nuclear 
technology and capabilities to avoid being surpassed by its rival and to maintain the 
balance of power in the region. 
 
The road to an Iranian nuclear agreement 
From 1982, Iran developed an indigenous clandestine nuclear program with the 
assistance of China, Russia, and Pakistan through the Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan 
proliferation network.309 In 2002, the National Council of Resistance to Iran, an Iranian 
dissident group living in exile, revealed the existence of this program. Iran subsequently 
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confirmed the existence of its program when it revealed the building of a uranium 
enrichment facility and a heavy water reactor during the Ahmadinejad presidency. 
Ahmadinejad constantly asserted that Iran had the right to pursue a nuclear program 
given the parameters of the NPT.310 Alsultan and Saeid pointed out, “Iran’s attempts to 
acquire nuclear power predate the Islamic Revolution; it was not until 2002 that 
preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability became a serious issue in Iran’s 
relations with the United States and other Western countries.”311 Therefore, over the 
course of the next 12 years, the international community engaged in negotiations with 
Iran regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear capability.  
A change in tone of the negotiations came in 2013. In that year, Hassan Rouhani 
replaced Ahmadinejad as president of Iran. One of Rouhani’s campaign promises was to 
begin negotiating with the West in earnest to remove the sanctions that were crippling 
Iran’s economy.312  Two years later, the framework for a final agreement, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was reached by the P5+1 (China, France, 
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran. The agreement 
did not dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, but rather ensured that it was used strictly for 
peaceful purposes.313 Iran agreed to restrictions which subjected its nuclear program to 
comprehensive and extensive monitoring for 10 to 15 years. Once Iran complied with the 
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JCPOA, economic and nuclear sanctions on Iran that had been implemented due to its 
non-compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were lifted. 
However, if Iran violated the terms of the JCPOA, sanctions would be re-imposed. The 
most touted accomplishment of the JCPOA was that it increased the break-out time for 
Iran, extending the amount of time needed for Iran to build a nuclear weapon from a 
several months to one year. Kenneth Katzman suggested, “[Currently,] Iran’s adherence 
to the JCPOA indicates that Iran has deferred a decision on the long-term future of its 
nuclear program,” but this future is vague and filled with many variables.314 Although the 
deal limited Iran’s enrichment program, A.K. Pasha stated, “For Tehran, the deal was 
concluded from a position of strength with its growing regional influence, especially in 
Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”315 This growing influence is key to the Saudi fears regarding 
Iran. 
 
The fear of a nuclear Iran 
Iran’s nuclear program instills fear in the region because there is uncertainty about 
its exact nature. While Iran does not currently have nuclear weapons, their development 
is presumed inevitable. Mark Fitzpatrick stated, “In Iran’s case, the nearly universal 
consensus is that, whether there has been a final decision to build a bomb, Tehran is at 
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least seeking a latent nuclear-weapon capability.”316 This belief has perpetuated fear 
about Iran’s nuclear program. 
Iran’s potential desire for having a nuclear capability is a multi-layered issue 
involving a quest for prestige, regional stability, the ability to trump the capabilities of the 
United States, security, or regional rivalry. Willis Stanley suggested that not only would a 
nuclear capability help the current leadership remain in power, but “a nuclear weapon 
capability also would help fulfill the leadership’s ambitions to make Iran the Islamic 
world’s preeminent power, a fulfillment of Iran’s self-appointed role as regional hegemon 
and as a beacon for all to convert to the true Islam.”317 Aside from status, nuclear 
weapons afford states a buffer from outward aggression. Fitzpatrick clarified, “Iran is 
presumed to have a security motivation for arming itself, particularly when it sees how 
American enemies that have nuclear weapons survive [like North Korea] while Iraq’s 
regime, which did not have them, no longer exists.”318 One of Iran’s fears is that the US 
will attempt a regime change in Iran, like the one they achieved in Iraq, especially after 
President George W. Bush included Iran in the “Axis of Evil”319 along with Iraq in his 
State of the Union address in 2002. A year after this speech, America instigated regime 
change in Iraq. The thought that the US would attempt a similar intervention permeated 
throughout the Iranian leadership. Katzman noted, “Some Iranian leaders argue that a 
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nuclear weapon could end Iran’s historic vulnerability to great power invasion, 
domination, or regime change attempts.”320 
Although Iran has seen the US as a threat since the formation of the Islamic 
Republic, the most immediate concern for Iran was Iraq. Iran’s nuclear program restarted 
in the 1980s as a response to Iraqi aggression. A nuclear weapon could have possibly 
deterred Iraq and “provided the strongest incentive [at the time] for Iran to seek non-
conventional capabilities.”321 Furthermore, Gawadat Bahgat stated, “This rivalry 
[between Iraq and Iran] was fueled by territorial disputes, ethnic and sectarian divisions, 
and conflicting ideological and foreign policy orientations.”322 With Iraq, now an ally 
instead of an enemy, Iran’s fear is directed toward the United States, which during the 
nuclear negotiations never repudiated the option of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. 
Thus, such a program, according to Bahgat, is more about “deterring a U.S. intervention 
in Iran’s policy and ensuring the survival of the Islamic regime.”323 Like its continued 
intervention in Iraq and Syria, regime survival has become paramount to the Iranian 
leadership. Bahgat stated, “Generally Iranian policy seems increasingly driven more by 
concern of the regime’s survival and less by ideological appeals.”324  A point echoed by 
the “Annual Report on Military Power of Iran” for 2015: 
Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive; it exists to insulate Iran from the 
consequence of Tehran’s more aggressive policies, such as use of covert action 
and terrorism, rather than as a means to project Iranian power. It is designed to 
deter attack, survive an initial strike, and retaliate against an aggressor to force a 
                                                 
320. Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies. 
321. Gawdat Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran," Iranian Studies 39, no. 3 
(2006): 314, doi:10.1080/00210860600808102. 
322. Ibid. 
323. Ibid., 320. 
324. Ibid., 316. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 107 
diplomatic solution to hostilities while avoiding any concessions that challenge its 
core interests.325 
Despite the regime’s opacity, survival appears to be a facet in their tactical thinking 
regarding domestic and foreign policy. 
 
Consequences of the Iran deal: From mass proliferation, increased terrorism, to 
possible regional stability 
 
One of the major outcomes of the JCPOA is that Iran received a windfall and 
recovered over $100 billion of assets previously frozen in foreign banks as a consequence 
of the imposition of nuclear sanctions. Once it complied with the guidelines outlined in 
the JCPOA in 2016, the funds were released.326 In addition to this $100 billion, it will 
have the unrestricted ability to sell its oil. With the repatriated funds and additional oil 
sales, the World Bank now predicts that the Iranian economy will grow by 6% by the end 
of 2016.327  
According to Patrick Clawson, the state of the Iranian economy is not as “dire” as 
perceived.328 Clawson saw the injection of funds as generating new opportunities for Iran. 
He pointed out that Iran’s economy, because of the 2008 financial crisis and the collapse 
of oil prices, underwent a recession in 2012 and 2013. This recession was followed by 
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several years of weak economic growth.329 However, during the last couple of years, 
economic growth increased (although it did not recover to 2007 levels).330 Clawson 
compared Iran’s economy to Greece’s, saying that, unlike Greece, Iran is far from 
economic collapse.331 He further stated that the increase of funds into Iran’s economy 
will not impact Iran’s foreign policy, as its foreign policy has never been tied to an 
economic rationale. Regarding its foreign policy, the Islamic Republic uses low-cost 
methods to be influential. Clawson estimated that Iran’s various pursuits, from its support 
of numerous militias to activities in Iraq and Syria, which he identified as wide as “from 
bribery to humanitarian aid” is only a tenth of the amount it will repatriate.332  He admits 
that most of the money will be spent on the domestic economy, but a portion “could” be 
devoted to foreign endeavors. Ilan Berman agreed with Clawson that much of the money 
may be spent domestically to heal its ailing economy, but money also be used for military 
modernization despite the continuation of a ban on conventional arms sales to Iran. 
Berman believes that Iran will circumvent this ban as it has in the past. Tehran will also 
boost its rogue state sponsorship and increase these alliances. It will also increase its 
terrorism financing and its endeavors in regional expansionism.333 It can be argued that 
Iran’s recent activities are not directed toward regional hegemony but more toward 
national security concerns, but Berman maintained: 
The past several years have seen the Islamic Republic embark upon an ambitious 
multi-pronged effort to reshape the region in its own image. This effort has 
included, inter alia, attempts to undermine the monarchy in Bahrain; extensive 
backing for Yemen’s Houthi insurgency; both financial and direct military 
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assistance to the Assad regime in Syria, and; broad geopolitical support for Iraq’s 
Shi’a militias.334 
 Furthermore, with this money, Michael Eisenstadt predicted, “it [Iran] will try to 
demonstrate that is a far more reliable partner than the United States” by furiously 
funding its foreign policy activities and allies.335 As the US is perceived to retreat from 
the Middle East, increased Iranian activities such as funding allies could prove a 
successful strategy. While it will not initially replace America, Iran could over time prove 
itself to be a strong partner. Therefore, Iran now has the potential to reshape regional 
alliances more in line with its interests.  
 
Fall out from a potentially nuclear-armed Iran 
Despite Iran’s defensive posture in regards to foreign policy, James M. Lindsay 
and Ray Takeyh spelled out the fears of an Iran with nuclear capabilities—that they could 
lead to weaponization:  
  The dangers of Iran’s entry into the nuclear club are well known: embolden by 
this development, Tehran might multiply its attempts at subverting its neighbors 
and encouraging terrorism against the United States and Israel; the risk of both 
conventional and nuclear war in the Middle East would escalate; more states in 
the region might also want to become nuclear powers; the geopolitical balance in 
the Middle East would be reordered; and broader efforts to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons would be undermined.336 
The threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, regardless of its posture, has created a global rippling 
effect.  For instance, Saudi Arabia has reacted to a potentially nuclear-armed Iran in 
multiple and increasingly elevated ways. Much of its response to this possibility has 
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stemmed from a reaction to American policy. Riyadh in the beginning adhered to its 
moderate foreign policy stance in which it reacted in conjunction with the US and did not 
deviate from American policy.  As such, after the conclusion of the JCPOA, the Saudis 
appeared to be open to a reconciliation with Iran. Stating by way of the official Saudi 
Press Agency that it had always been supportive of such an agreement and that this 
agreement laid the foundation for a normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
as long as Iran invoked a good neighbor policy and thus refrained from interfering in its 
neighbors’ domestic spheres.337 This statement was in line with Saudi foreign policy at 
the time, but Saudi Arabia and Iran did not normalize relations. Instead, the exact 
opposite ensued.  
The exact opposite occurred because Riyadh saw American policy as an opening 
toward a rapprochement with Tehran and Riyadh became worried about this 
development. It became so worried that it felt that Washington was abandoning it in favor 
of Tehran. Negotiating the deal was seen as an opening to a new relationship between 
Iran and the US at the expense of Saudi Arabia as the US and Iran engaged in an unheard 
of and new level of diplomacy because of the tension and hostility between them. 
According to Mai Yamani, Saudi Arabia saw a thawing of the relationship between Iran 
and the US because of the deal. This new opening Riyadh perceived as Washington 
acknowledging and thus legitimizing Tehran’s growing influence in the region. 
Legitimizing Iran’s influence also by extension, conceded Iran’s hegemonic 
aspirations.338 Initially, the US adamantly opposed the possibility of a nuclear Iran 
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because “the United States feared once Iran acquired nuclear weapons capability, it 
would no longer be susceptible to conventional US military intervention and would 
pursue an aggressive anti-US foreign policy in the Middle East.”339 Furthermore, 
Katzman pointed out, “U.S. officials also assert that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear 
weapon would produce a nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most volatile regions 
and that Iran might transfer nuclear technology to extremist groups.”340  
However, America’s position regarding a nuclear Iran changed as the US engaged 
in diplomacy with Iran to mitigate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, not to remove its nuclear 
program. It changed because “the Obama administration saw the nuclear deal as a way to 
mitigate that threat [of a nuclear-armed Iran] and did not view Iran as an existential 
threat.”341 Plus, Obama saw the deal as a way to enhance Gulf security as Iran’s nuclear 
capability would be veraciously verified and by curtailing Iran’s nuclear capabilities, a 
nuclear arms race in the region would be stemmed.  
The prevention of an arms race was not the only outcome from the deal. The 
Obama administration had high hopes for the future of Iranian-American relations. 
According to Gause, “After the deal, Washington hoped to engage Tehran in regional 
diplomacy, particularly over Syria, and perhaps even normalize relations. The 
administration has not yet realized those hopes, but Obama clearly wants to cooperate 
with Iran even as he seeks to limit its influence.”342 This change by the Americans caused 
the Saudis to think that the US was engaging in conciliatory gestures toward Iran and 
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subsequently indifferent to the Saudi plight in regards to Iran and its agenda.343 But as 
Blanchard pointed out, Saudi Arabia maybe mistaken in its assessment of America’s 
policy. Despite, a change toward Iran coming from the former President, “U.S. officials 
downplay the prospects for such a change, and some Members of Congress vocally 
oppose the idea.”344 Perhaps, what is not understood by the Saudis is the President is not 
the sole arbiter of policy and despite his wishes, he needs to maneuver and gain approval 
from the legislative branch of government before making sweeping changes in the 
American relationship with Iran. 
In response to this perceived opening, Saudi Arabia intensified it foreign policy, 
shifting from a passive to an active policy. Furthermore, Pasha deduced from Riyadh’s 
actions that: 
Riyadh feels threatened and targeted by the growing Iranian interference in its 
traditional spheres of influence and feels without a fundamental change in Iranian 
policies, there can be no dialogue or improvement in relations…Since the 
situation in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, or Iraq is not moving in its direction, the 
Saudis fear Iran is backing its enemies and the new Saudi leadership sees ‘Iran’s 
policies as part of an expansionist, sectarian agenda aimed at empowering Shia 
Muslims in the region at the expense of Sunnis.’345 
For its part, Iran makes similar accusation against Saudi Arabia. Katzman described 
Iran’s frustration with Saudi foreign policy. He said, “Iranian leaders assert that Saudi 
Arabia seeks hegemony for its school of Sunni Islam and to deny Iran and Shiite Muslims 
in general any influence in the region.”346 As such, “Iranian aid to Shiite-dominated 
governments and Shiites in Sunni-dominated countries aggravates sectarian tension 
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contributing to a virtually existential war by proxy with Saudi Arabia.”347 Saudi Arabia 
has not seen this level of engagement from Iran in supposedly Arab affairs since the 
revolution, when it was actively attempting to export its revolution to its Arab neighbors. 
Riyadh believed that a nuclear Iran would continue to pursue its hegemonic agenda as it 
desired through increased intervention because power within the region would have tilted 
so heavily in Iran’s favor that there would not be anyone to impede its actions. Iran 
would grow in influence to the detriment of Saudi influence. Riyadh would not be able to 
counter Tehran as it lacked similar capabilities and America would be absent because of 
its growing indifference. Pasha further argued, “The Saudis also feared the United States 
might try to use the nuclear deal with Iran as an excuse to get out of the region or at least 
lessen its commitments.”348 Saudi political analysts and outspoken members of the royal 
family “strongly reflected the Saudi thinking though not public which also highlighted 
that the only option available for Saudi Arabia and its friends was to take matters into 
their own hands, and if necessary, including the acquisition of a full nuclear cycle to 
match the Iranian capabilities.”349 Unimpeded Iranian influence was unacceptable to the 
Saudis. Thus, a nuclear Iran could prompt a regional arms race.350  
 
Saudi options for procuring a nuclear capability  
Saudi Arabia has always believed that Iran’s nuclear program was not purely for 
civilian purposes, but also possessed military applications.351 The Kingdom, for its part, 
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has expressed an interest in having the same nuclear capabilities as Iran.352 As a signatory 
of the NPT, Riyadh does have this right. Pasha concluded, “Spurred by the American 
overtures [to Iran], Saudis appeared to be inclining toward building nuclear plants and 
signed nuclear cooperation agreements with countries such as South Korea.”353 Nuclear 
energy would or could be the precursor to developing weapons capabilities which George 
Perkovich determined is the sole way Riyadh could deter Iran and “equalize Iran’s 
overall power” because again, an Iran with nuclear weapons tilts the balance of power in 
the region in its favor. 354 However, the development of nuclear capabilities remains 
decades away for Saudi Arabia. For one, it lacks the indigenous expertise to foster 
nuclear capabilities. It is committed to creating this workforce, but this will not occur 
anytime soon. This lack of a qualified workforce places Riyadh in a predicament, as 
Saudi Arabia believes that the threat Iran poses is imminent.355 Saudi Arabia has a host of 
other hurdles (too many to name here) that must be resolved before it can even begin 
developing its nuclear energy capabilities.356 Regardless of the path Riyadh takes to gain 
nuclear weapons, as Eric Edelmen et al., pointed out, “Any decision by the Saudi 
government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly 
destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to 
pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by 
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eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation.”357 Therefore, should Saudi 
Arabia proceed with attaining nuclear capabilities, the region would drift dangerously 
into a nuclear arms race.  
But the exact path it would take to acquire its own nuclear capability are vague. 
Christopher M. Blanchard stated, “Specifically, analysts continue to debate whether the 
kingdom might seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability [through its close 
connections with nuclear-armed Pakistan], a nuclear threshold status, or a formal U.S. 
defense guarantee if Iran moves toward creating a nuclear weapon or retains the 
capability to do so without what Saudi officials see as sufficient constraints or 
warnings.”358 Furthermore, there are limits to the restrictions that could be placed on 
Riyadh if it decided to attempt to build an indigenous program in a search for parity with 
Iran. Blanchard acknowledged, “Isolating Saudi Arabia economically in the event its 
nuclear program becomes a matter of proliferation concern would likely prove difficult 
for concerned parties given the kingdom’s central role in the world’s oil market, its vast 
wealth, and its global investment posture.”359 Therefore, Riyadh has room to maneuver in 
regards to its developing a nuclear capability as isolation or sanctions might have little to 
no effect on the path it takes. 
However, for Kenneth Waltz, the possibility of a nuclear arms race would be a 
stabilizing factor. He stated, “Yet so far, every time another country has managed to 
shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and 
decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear 
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states generally produce more regional stability, not less.”360 He further argues that 
regional instability was created by Israel, the lone nuclear power in the Middle East, 
instead of by the supposed aspirations of other states in the region. He added that the 
desire to be a part of the Middle East nuclear club was not a relatively new phenomenon, 
but began when Israel created its nuclear program. This was not the case, however, as 
other Middle Eastern states did not seek out nuclear capabilities until Iran’s program was 
brought to the forefront. 
 
Conclusion  
Saudi Arabia shares the US view regarding nuclear proliferation and feels 
threatened by Iran’s nuclear program. Riyadh has shown tepid approval of the agreement. 
Despite this view, King Salman of Saudi Arabia, along with President Barack Obama, 
released a joint statement regarding the JCPOA. The statement reads: 
The two parties affirmed the need to continue efforts to maintain security, 
prosperity and stability in the region and in particular to counter Iran’s 
destabilizing activities. In this regard, King Salman [of Saudi Arabia] expressed 
his support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran 
and the P5+1 countries, which once fully implemented will prevent Iran from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon and thereby enhance security in the region.361 
Given Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States, it is not surprising that the King 
released a joint statement regarding the Iran nuclear agreement. The relationship that 
Riyadh has built with Washington, especially since the Iranian Revolution, has been 
instrumental in the way Riyadh interacts with the world. It has been the stable pillar that 
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the US relies to maintain American influence in the Gulf. With the Saudi fear that the 
deal would be used by the US to reduce or abandon its commitments in the region, 
Obama reassured the King that “the United States is committed as ever to work with our 
Gulf partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region and promote stability 
as well as resolutions to the region’s crises.”362 Furthermore, as Blanchard attested, “The 
Obama Administration, like its predecessors, engaged the Saudi government as a 
strategic partner to promote regional security and global economic stability.”363 
Blanchard continued, “Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United 
States anchored by long-standing military training programs and supplemented by 
ongoing high-value weapons sales and new critical infrastructure security cooperation 
and counterterrorism initiatives. These security ties would be difficult and costly for 
either side to fully break or replace.”364 
Despite reassurance that America was committed to the Gulf, during his time in 
office, Obama attempted to pivot American foreign policy away from the Gulf and 
toward other concerns. This attempt toward a reorientation of American foreign policy 
has left the Kingdom feeling even more abandoned, and now it feels overtaken by Iran. 
There is fear within the Kingdom that the nuclear deal will bring Iran closer to the US, 
which again adds to Riyadh’s sense of abandonment. President Obama told Jeffery 
Goldberg of The Atlantic that “‘they [the Saudis] need to find an effective way to share 
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the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.’”365 Statements like this worry 
the Saudis, who were suspicious of Obama’s intentions toward the Middle East and 
“never trusted Obama.”366 The Saudis were wary of any attempts by the Obama 
administration to change American foreign policy, especially as it concerns Iran, and saw 
such changes as overtures toward reconciliation. The pivot the US made in foreign policy 
was toward Iran according to the Saudis.367 
Regarding the JCPOA, Katzman said, “The Obama Administration assessed Iran 
as implementing the JCPOA and asserted that the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran has 
receded. The Trump Administration has not contradicted that assessment, while, on 
February 1, 2017, clearly articulating the view that Iran is an adversary whose ‘malign 
activities’ in the region continue.”368 Now that Donald Trump is in office there are 
questions regarding the nature of his administration’s Iran policy. Blanchard pointed to a 
joint statement between Trump and King Salman after Trumps state visit to Saudi Arabia 
in May 2017. The statement “condemns Iranian ‘malign interference in the internal affair 
of other states’ and says the JCPOA ‘needs to be re-examined in some of the clauses.’”369 
As it stands, despite maligning the JCPOA as a “bad deal” and vowing to “tear [it] up,” 
while he was Candidate Trump. He has not pursued an Iran policy. Instead, he has been 
preoccupied with other policies, such as the border wall, healthcare reform and a 
“Muslim ban.” His campaign promise to renegotiate the JCPOA has pitfalls.  
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Even if the US were to walk away from the agreement, there are five other 
countries involved. The US needs the other states to re-impose a strict sanctions regime. 
According to David Hannay and Thomas R. Pickering, “Five of the negotiating partners 
(China, France, Germany, Russia and the UK) have all made clear to the US Congress at 
an official level that they would not support new sanctions if the US sought to void the 
agreement by withdrawing from it.”370 Furthermore, “it [Iran] could well decide to 
remain in the JCPOA with the other five negotiating countries, leaving the US isolated 
and without the backing needed for widespread trade and economic pressure.”371 Walking 
away according to Hannay and Pickering could have an impact on America’s ability to be 
an international leader, as the majority of the world supports the agreement and “would 
not understand or support destroying it on the promise of future benefits.”372  
In April 2017, the State Department issued a certification that Iran was complying 
with the agreement. After the certification was issued, Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, 
stated that “Iran continued to threaten the United States and the rest of the world, and he 
announced that the Trump administration was reviewing ways to counter challenges 
posed by Tehran.”373 However, he stopped short of saying that the administration was 
going “to retain it instead of ripping it up or renegotiating the agreement as promised 
[during the campaign].”374  
Despite the lack of a consistent Iran policy, the Trump administration has, 
according to The New York Times, attempted to repair the relationship between the US 
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and Saudi Arabia. At the United Sates–Saudi Arabia chief executive summit meeting, 
Tillerson said “he was ‘pleased to be here today to reaffirm the very strong partnership 
that exists between the United States and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’”375   
Notwithstanding a strain in relations during the Obama administration, Blanchard stated, 
“Nevertheless, bilateral ties have been bolstered by major new arms sales, continued 
security training arrangements, enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, and shared 
concerns about Iran, Al Qaeda, and the rise of the Islamic State organization (IS, aka 
ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da’esh).”376  The new $110 billion arms sales nearly 
double the Obama administration’s last arms sale to Riyadh in 2016.377 Blanchard 
pointed out, “With limits on arms sales to Iran in place at least until 2020, expanded U.S.-
Saudi defense cooperation and arms transferred should further improve Saudi Arabia’s 
conventional military advantage and ability to meet potential unconventional threats from 
Iran or Iranian proxies.”378   
Even with the state visit and the arms sales, Blanchard argued, “It remains to be 
seen if the Administration’s stated desire to repair and deepen relations with the kingdom 
will result in more aligned and cooperative joint efforts on issues of common concern.”379  
However, the month that Trump took office he called King Salman “reaffirming bilateral 
ties and discussing a range of proposals for further strengthening relation, particularly in 
terms of counterterrorism, regional stability, and economic and energy cooperation.”380  
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In spite of this reaffirmation of Saudi-American ties and interests, there are not any 
public plans to demonstrate this commitment besides the arms sales.  
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CONCLUSION: THE CURRENT STATE OF AN INTRACTABLE 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Presently, Saudi Arabia and Iran are mired in an intractable conflict in which each 
side sees itself as a martyr fighting against a hegemonic malevolence with ambitions to 
control the Middle East.381 There is not an actual war between the two states, but rather 
verbal sparring and multi-front proxy fighting in regional conflicts.382 The likelihood that 
they would engage in an actual war is low, as provocation by either side would lead to 
American involvement to stabilize the situation. As the American relationship with Saudi 
Arabia, especially, was built in an era of state on state violence. However, Perry 
Cammack suggested this type of relationship is becoming obsolete “in a region of failed 
states, collapsing states, and non-state actors.”383 According to Cammack, in a situation 
such as Iranian aggression toward Saudi Arabia, “Washington has signaled its intentions 
to support the Saudis against external threats, as it did by evicting Saddam Hussein from 
Kuwait in 1991. The problem is that Saudi Arabia doesn’t necessarily see external threats 
as their main security threats,”384 otherwise they would recognize the Islamic State as an 
existential threat. Instead, as Cammack continued: 
They look around at the collapse of states in the region, like in Syria, and the 
threat of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Lebanon and worry that the United 
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States isn’t doing enough in response. So the two sides are defining the security 
challenges differently, and neither the United Sates nor the Saudis, nor anyone 
else frankly, has an answer as to how to deal with the internal political challenges 
that these states are facing.385 
For Saudi Arabia, the threat comes from Iran and its dalliances in the region. Iran’s 
activity threatens Riyadh’s role in the Gulf. It sidelines its influence and relevance.  
The decline of the Saudi-Iranian relationship has multiple origins, beginning with 
the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, and accelerating after the Arab Spring, which 
began toward the end of 2010. These two events had significant impacts on the region 
and, unlike other causes often blamed as the root of their conflict, they had immediate 
and tangible consequences.  
The American intervention in Iraq in 2003 and subsequent toppling of the Iraqi 
government led by Saddam Hussein was the beginning of the change within Saudi-
Iranian relations, which had begun to take a positive trajectory after the death of Iran’s 
former leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini had been a fervent anti-monarchist and 
detested the Kingdom and its form of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism.386 With the toppling of 
Saddam, a power vacuum opened in Iraq, Iran was fearful that the US was going to 
invade it next. Afshon Ostovar pointed out, “After being dubbed part of an ‘axis of evil’ 
in [then President George W.] Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, Iran’s leaders 
began to worry about growing military threat from the United States…The presence of 
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops right across the border in Iraq, not to mention also 
in nearby Afghanistan, was threatening to Iran.”387 The Iranian regime has always feared 
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that the Americans would instigate regime change within Iran, as the US has a history of 
engaging in such activities (e.g. the coup in 1953). This past has left the Iranian regime 
fearful to the point of paranoia regarding American actions in the region.388 According to 
Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky, “Iran’s national objectives were the preservation of the 
state and its territory, and from 1979, also the preservation of the revolutionary-religious 
identity of its political system—the nizam.”389 Iran’s foreign policy, especially since 
Khomeini’s death in 1989, has moved away from revolutionary fervor and toward 
“preventing the emergence of threats and neutralizing existing threats.”390 According to 
Eskander Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Iran’s asymmetric strategies in the post-Khomeini era are 
best understood as emerging from its security dilemma as opposed to territorial ambitions 
or the intractable need to perpetually export its Islamic revolution.”391 To insulate itself 
from potential threats and create a strategic depth, Iran sought ties with the burgeoning 
Iraqi government, which was dominated by the Shi’ite majority of Iraq.392 Also, through 
sectarian affiliations Iran began to assist Iraqi Shi’ite militias to uproot any foothold the 
Americans might have in Iraq that could be used to invade Iran. Ostovar described the 
Iranian strategy, “Through its Shia clients, Iran possessed the ability to harass and target 
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U.S. forces by proxy, and it could threaten to escalate that violence should the United 
States ever strike Iran.”393  
Although Iran used more than Shi’ite militias, Iran’s actions have been touted as 
sectarian in nature to vilify its actions and thus isolate it. Tira and Guzansky aptly pointed 
out, “Iran is increasingly perceived in the Arab and Sunni world as a threatening force, 
and its operation, mainly through Shiite communities, is arousing primal fears.”394 Its 
main affiliates may be Shi’a, but it has also worked with Sunnis and Kurds.395 However, 
Iran’s affiliations with Shi’ite militias have overshadowed its attempt to diversify its 
supporters in Iraq. Nader described Iran’s actions as leading to distancing any potential 
Sunni support. He said, “Iran’s favoring of Shi’a political parties and militias is viewed 
by Sunnis as a broader campaign of disenfranchisement and marginalization.”396 
Furthermore, the abuses committed by Shi’ite militias against Sunnis have empowered 
Sunni jihadist groups like the Islamic State.397 
Similarly, Iran’s actions and affiliations in the Syrian Civil War have given 
credence to the perception that it works only with the Shi’a or on behalf of the Shi’a. 
Being perceived as having a sectarian agenda only hurts Iran, which has continued to see 
itself as a Pan-Islamic movement that appeals to all Muslims since the revolution. Despite 
this desire for universal appeal, Iran is using the sectarian tensions to aid its fights in Iraq 
and Syria. Ostovar pointed out, “Such sectarianism runs counter to Tehran’s official 
positions, but close relationships with Shia allies have become the basis of Iranian 
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influence in the region. With its allies threatened…Iran has doubled down on its pro-Shia 
strategy as a way of protecting its regional interests and investments.”398 Iran has been 
using the sectarian nature of these conflicts to its advantage. Ostovar noted, “Iran has 
facilitated the entry of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, and eventually Shia 
Afghan and Pakistani mercenaries to help the loyalist effort [in Syria]. This has made 
Iran’s side of the conflict distinctly Shia and sectarian.”399 Iran does not see itself as 
involved in a sectarian war in Syria on behalf of fellow Shi’a. Instead, according to 
Nader, Iran sees the Alawite government “as a useful geopolitical ally,” that helps 
facilitate its strategic depth against enemies like Israel and the US.400 It needs Iraq and 
Syria to be home to friendly governments because it fears outward aggression toward its 
regime. It is trying to insulate itself from attacks like the one that occurred in June 2017. 
Iran’s actions have been described as overtly sectarian and part of Iran’s 
expansionist agenda.401 Many see Iran’s feverish activity throughout the region, 
particularly Riyadh, as the very definition of expansionist. Ostovar explained: 
Iran’s critics, especially Saudi Arabia, view its foreign policy as sectarian and 
expansionist. They argue that Iran has been exploiting political unrest across the 
region to champion its militant Shia clients and undermine the Sunni-dominated 
status quo. They see Iran’s endgame as an expansive, transnational, pro-Iranian 
Shia policy stretching from Iran to Lebanon and encompassing Iraq and Syria—
something akin to a resurrected Persian empire, but with the Shia faith and 
allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader as the unifying characteristics.402 
This is the “Shi’ite Crescent;” an idea coined by King Abdullah of Jordan to rally Sunnis 
together and present Iran as an external threat poised to take over the Middle East.403 
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Although a tool of manipulation, the idea of the “Shi’ite Crescent” has fueled debate over 
the nature of Iran’s activities. This external threat is used to deflect from domestic 
instability, especially in Saudi Arabia.  
Riyadh has demonized the Shi’a to prevent a bonding across sectors of the Saudi 
populace, first after the revolution and again after the Arab Spring.404 al-Rasheed 
explained, “The Saudi regime frightened its own Sunni majority by exaggerating the 
Iranian expansionist project in the region and its rising influence among the Shi’a of the 
Arab world.”405 Along with this act, the al-Sauds have successfully bought the loyalty of 
the Sunni majority in their country through “economic largesse” from oil profits to 
prevent them from seeking a voice in the government, so that the al-Sauds can maintain a 
firm control on power.406 Further, the act of demonizing the Shi’a led to a division 
between the Sunni and Shi’ites, which prevents them from bonding over shared goals, 
such as a voice in Saudi government, which could lead to a toppling of the Saudi regime. 
Once different segments of Saudi society realize that they share commonalities, they will 
be able to unite, a prospect that frightens the regime. Its survival is paramount because, as 
al-Rasheed pointed out, “The real threat to Saudi authoritarianism is the development of a 
national opposition composed of both Sunnis and Shi’a, and Islamists and secularists.”407 
The Saudi regime is not trying to save their Sunnis or the entire Sunni community from 
Shi’ite encroachment, but is trying to save itself.408 
 In the end, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are trying to save themselves, not from 
each other but from the possibility of their regimes being toppled by foreign entities (in 
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the case of Iran) or through domestic upheaval (in the case of Saudi Arabia). They both 
also face threats from the Islamic State, whose growth and increasing appeal they blame 
on the US.409  It is also unlikely that Saudi Arabia and Iran will work together given that 
each blames its problems on the other, while each is asserting that they would work 
together if the other would refrain from sectarian and expansionist activities.410 It is 
unlikely that the US and Iran will work together in the fight against the Islamic State 
because Tehran still fiercely defines itself as against the US. Any diplomacy between the 
US and Iran may ease hostilities, but it will not end them. Saudi Arabia and the US, 
especially since President Donald Trump took office, see Iran as the greater threat. 
Former President Barack Obama wanted Iran and Saudi Arabia to work together to 
“share” the Middle East. Under Obama, Riyadh began to reevaluate its friendship with 
the US, particularly after the Iran Nuclear Deal. With this reevaluation, Saudi Arabia 
changed the focus of its foreign policy to be more active, instead of steeped in cash and 
diplomacy. Iran, according to Kayhan Barzegar and Abdolrasool Divsallar, believes that 
Saudi Arabia is working outside of its “strategic limits” and thus will have to mitigate its 
active foreign policy.411 They state, “From Iran’s perspective, Saudi Arabia is currently 
acting beyond its strategic capability and national strength. This policy cannot last long, 
and sooner or later Saudi Arabia will adjust its regional policies to region’s political-
security and societal realities.”412 For Barzegar and Divsallar, Iran’s real fear is that Saudi 
Arabia will get the US more involved in regional conflicts.413 This involvement by the 
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US, once again heightens fears by Iran of American meddling in Iran’s domestic affairs 
and the potential for regime change. Given the desire of the Trump administration to 
rebuild the strained Saudi-American relationship, Iran’s fears of American involvement 
in the Middle East are not unfounded. In the latest CRS Report on Saudi Arabia, 
Christopher M. Blanchard pointed to a call Trump made to King Salman in January 2017 
in which Trump vocalized support for stronger ties between the two states.414 In May 
2017, Trump visited Saudi Arabia. During this visit, Trump wanted to repair the 
weakened Saudi-American relationship and Trump and King Salman agreed to a 
“Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century.”415 In this partnership the United States and 
Saudi Arabia will be “charting a renewed path toward a peaceful Middle East where 
economic development, trade, and diplomacy are hallmarks of regional and global 
engagement.”416 The exact details of this partnership were not given but it appears as if 
both countries are making strides to strengthen the bonds between them after the distance 
that was created during the Obama administration. The renewal of their relationship 
might be an attempt to isolate Iran, but Trump’s Middle East policy is still considered to 
be under development, therefore the celebrations by Saudi Arabia and cries of foul by 
Iran may be premature. 417
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Fürtig, Henner. Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars. Reading, UK: 
Ithaca Press, 2002.  
 
Gause, F. Gregory, III. "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973." 
Review of International Studies 11, no. 04 (1985): 247-273. 
doi:10.1017/s0260210500114172. 
 
———. “The Illogic of Dual Containment.” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 56-66. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20045919. 
 
———. “The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations: The Kingdom and the Power.” Foreign 
Affairs 95, no.4 (2016): 114-126.  
 
Gerges, Fawaz A. "The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in 
Yemen: Co-Opting Arab Nationalism." Middle East Journal 49, no. 2 (April 
1995): 292-311. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4328805?ref=search-
gateway:781803e5661e90a17a14696ef2a9556e. 
 
Goldberg, Jacob. "Saudi Arabia and the Iranian Revolution: The Religious Dimension." 
In The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, edited by David Menashri, 155-
170. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. 
 
———. "The Shi’i Minority in Saudi Arabia." In Shi'ism and Social Protest, edited by 
Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, 230-244. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986. 
 
TEMPLATE 
 
 135 
Goldberg, Jeffery. "The Obama Doctrine." The Atlantic, April 2016, 50-80. 
http://businesstoday.lk/pdf/june_2016/President_Obamas_Interview_With_Jeffre
y_Goldberg.pdf. 
 
Goodarzi, Jubin. "Iran: Syria as the First Line of Defence." In The Regional Struggle for 
Syria, by Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy, 25-32. London: European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 
 
Haass, Richard. "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Twin Pillars in Revolutionary Times." In 
The Security of the Persian Gulf, edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi, 151-169. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 
 
Halliday, Fred. "The Gulf between Two Revolutions: 1958-1979." MERIP Reports, no. 
85 (1980): 6-15. doi:10.2307/3010801. 
 
 
Harris, Gardiner. "Tillerson Toughens Tone on Iran After U.S. Confirms Nuclear Deal 
Compliance," The New York Times, April 19, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/middleeast/trump-administration-
grudgingly-confirms-irans-compliance-with-nuclear-deal.html?_r=0. 
 
Hannay, David and Thomas R. Pickering. "Building on the Iran Nuclear Agreement." 
Survival 59, no. 2 (March 20, 2017): 156. doi:10.1080/00396338.2017.1302195. 
 
Hassan, Hassan. "The Gulf States: United against Iran, Divided over Islamists." In The 
Regional Struggle for Syria, by Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy, 17-24. 
London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 
 
Henderson, Simon, and Olli Heinonen. "Regional Nuclear Plans in the Aftermath of an 
Iran Deal." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. November 21, 2014. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/regional-nuclear-plans-
in-the-aftermath-of-an-iran-deal. 
 
Hokayem, Emile. "Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War." Survival 56, no. 6 
(2014): 59-80. doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.985438.  
 
Hunter, Shireen T. "Post-Khomeini Iran." Foreign Affairs 68, no. 5 (1989): 133-149. 
doi:10.2307/20044204. 
Indyk, Martin. “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East.” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Accessed September 18, 2016. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-clinton-
administrations-approach-to-the-middle-east. 
 
Jahanpour, Farhang. "Iran after Khomeini." The World Today 45, no. 8/9 (August 01, 
1989): 150-163. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/40396134?ref=search-
gateway:fa0c331fbb917c6a8fedc509330d793f. 
TEMPLATE 
 
 136 
 
Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq 
War. Cornell University Press, 2010. 
 
Jones, Toby Craig. "Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization, and 
the Shia Uprising of 1979." International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 
02 (2006): 213-233. 
 
———. “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East.” The Journal of American History, 
(2012): 208-218. doi:10.1093/jahist/jas045. 
 
Kamrava, Mehran. "Iran and Its Persian Gulf Neighbors." In Iranian Foreign Policy 
since 2001 Alone in the World, by Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi, 104-119. 
London: Routledge, 2013. 
 
———. "The Nuclear Question in the Middle East: Context, Complexities, and 
Paradoxes." In The Nuclear Question in the Middle East, by Mehran Kamrava, 1-
20. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
 
Kaye, Dalia Dassa, and Frederic M. Wehrey. "A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of 
Neighbours." Survival 49, no. 2 (2007): 111-128. 
doi:10.1080/00396330701437777. 
 
Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. London: Tauris, 2014. 
 
Keynoush, Azra Banafsheh. The Iranian-Saudi Arabian Relationship: From Ideological 
Confrontation to Pragmatic Accommodation. Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy: Tufts University, 2007. 
 
Keynoush, Banafsheh. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.  
 
Khomeini, Ruhollah, and Hamid Algar. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations 
of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981.  
 
Khomeini, Ruhollah. Islamic Government. SIME, 2010.  
 
Lake, Eli. "Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad." Bloomberg. June 09, 2015. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-to-
prop-up-assad. 
 
Legrenzi, Matteo and Fred H. Lawson. “Saudi Arabia Calls Out Hezbollah: Why Now?” 
Middle East Policy 23, no. 2 (2016): 31-43. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12193. 
 
TEMPLATE 
 
 137 
Lindsay, James M. and Ray Takeyh. "After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its 
Complications." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (2010): 33-49. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699849. 
 
Lorber, Eric B. "President Trump and the Iran Nuclear Deal." Foreign Policy. November 
11, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/president-trump-and-the-iran-
nuclear-deal/. 
 
Menashri, David. "Iran's Regional Policy: Between Radicalism and Pragmatism." Journal 
of International Affairs 60, no. 2, IRAN: Sixtieth Anniversary Issue 1947-2007 
(April 01, 2007): 153-167. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24357976?ref=search-
gateway:c8df9f625298d9f15d8f1432d87c719b. 
 
———. Post-revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power. London: 
Routledge, 2007. 
 
Miglietta, John P. American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, 
and Saudi Arabia. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002.  
 
Milani, Mohsen M. "Iran's Post-Cold War Policy in the Persian Gulf." International 
Journal 49, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 328-354. doi:10.2307/40202941. 
 
———. The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.  
 
Milani, Mohsen. "Why Tehran Won't Abandon Assad(ism)." The Washington Quarterly 
36, no. 4 (2013): 79-93. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2013.861715. 
 
———. “Iran’s Regional Policies One Year After the Nuclear Deal.” Accessed July 12, 
2017https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91814/WorkingPaper-Iran-
Milani-051916.pdf?sequence=1. 
 
Nader, Alireza. Iran After the Bomb: How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran 
Behave? Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2013. 
 
———. Iran's Role in Iraq: Room for U.S.-Iran Cooperation? Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 2015.  
 
Nadimi, Farzin. "Iran's Expanding Military Role in Iraq." The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy. September 8, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/irans-expanding-military-role-in-iraq. 
 
Nixon, Richard. "Richard Nixon: Informal Remarks in Guam." The American Presidency 
Project. Accessed July 13, 2016. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140. 
 
TEMPLATE 
 
 138 
Nonneman, Gerd. "The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and 
Continuities." In Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War, edited by Lawrence G. 
Potter and Gary G. Sick, 167-192. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
 
Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and the United States of America.” The White House. May 23, 2017. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/23/joint-statement-
between-kingdom-saudi-arabia-and-united-states-america. 
 
———. "Joint Statement on the Meeting between President Barack Obama and King 
Salman Bin Abd AlAziz Al Saud." The White House. September 4, 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/04/joint-statement-
meeting-between-president-barack-obama-and-king-salman. 
 
———.  “Readout of the President’s Call with King Salman bin Abdulaziz of Saudi 
Arabia.” The White House. July 14, 2015.  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/readout-
president%E2%80%99s-call-king-salman-bin-abdulaziz-saudi-arabia. 
 
Ostovar, Afshon. "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and 
Identity Politics Collide." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
November 30, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/30/sectarian-
dilemmas-in-iranian-foreign-policy-when-strategy-and-identity-politics-collide-
pub-66288. 
 
Parasiliti, Andrew, Kathleen Reedy, and Becca Wasser. "Preventing State Collapse in 
Syria." Rand. Accessed April 23, 2017. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE219/RAND_
PE219.pdf. 
 
Pasha, A.K. “Saudi Arabia and the Iranian Nuclear Deal.” Contemporary Review of the 
Middle East 3, no. 4 (2016):387-404. doi:10.1177/2347798916664613. 
 
Perkovich, George. "Why the Iran Nuclear Deal Is Not the North Korea Deal." Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. April 28, 2015. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/28/why-iran-nuclear-deal-is-not-north-
korea-deal-pub-59923. 
 
Rafati, Naysan."Iran and the Arab Spring," Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 50 
(December 10, 2011): 49-52, http://bmcsr.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS__IranAndArabSpring_Rafati.pdf 
 
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in 
Modernizing Nations. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975. 
 
TEMPLATE 
 
 139 
———. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.  
 
Regier, Terry, and Muhammad Ali Khalidi. "The Arab Street: Tracking a Political 
Metaphor." The Middle East Journal 63, no. 1 (2009): 11-29. 
doi:10.3751/63.1.11. 
 
Roy, Olivier. "The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran." Middle East Journal 53, no. 2 
(April 01, 1999): 201-216. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4329317?ref=search-
gateway:aa89d82e70b02a447771d01f4ad7b363. 
 
Rubin, Barry. “American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1981.” 
International Society of Iranian Studies 13, no. 1/4 (1982): 307-326. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4310345. 
 
Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, Eskander. "Strategic Depth, Counterinsurgency, and the Logic of 
Sectarianization: The Islamic Republic of Iran's Security Doctrine and Its 
Regional Implications." In Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the 
Middle East, edited by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, 159-184. London: 
Hurst Et Company, 2017. 
 
Safran, Nadav. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985.  
 
Sick, Gary. "Rethinking Dual Containment." Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): 5-32. 
doi:10.1093/survival/40.1.5. 
 
Smilowitz, Elliot "Trump: Iran Deal Was So Bad It's Suspicious." The Hill. Accessed 
April 10, 2017. http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/gop-primaries/264598-trump-
iran-deal-was-so-bad-its-suspicious. 
 
Stanley, Willis. "Iranian Strategic Culture and Its Persian Origins." In Strategic Culture 
and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative 
National Security Policymaking, edited by Jeannie L. Johnson, Jeffrey Arthur 
Larsen, and Kerry M. Kartchner, 137-156. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 
Stover, Eric, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti. "Bremer's ‘Gordian Knot:’ Transitional 
Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq." Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 
(2005): 830-857. doi:10.1353/hrq.2005.0044. 
 
Sukin, Lauren. "Beyond Iran: Containing Nuclear Development in the Middle East." The 
Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 3-4 (2015): 379-400. 
doi:10.1080/10736700.2016.1152010. 
 
TEMPLATE 
 
 140 
Tableblu, Behnam Ben, and Karim Sadjadpour. "Iran: Leveraging Chaos." In Geopolitics 
and Democracy in the Middle East, edited by Kristina Kausch, 35-48. Madrid, 
Spain: FRIDE, 2014. 
 
Takeyh, Ray. "The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment." The Middle East Journal 64, no. 3 
(2010): 365-383. doi:10.3751/64.3.12. 
 
———. "Iran's New Iraq." Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 13-30. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/25482470?ref=search-
gateway:0f8bf6a658eef21f015e8d3986d0716a. 
 
Teitelbaum Joshua. "The Gulf States and the End of Dual Containment," Middle East 2, 
no. 3 (1998): 21-26. 
 
Terrill, W. Andrew. "Iran's Strategy for Saving Asad." The Middle East Journal 69, no. 2 
(Spring 2015): 222-236. doi:10.3751/69.2.13. 
 
———. The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security. Carlisle, Pa: 
U. S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 2014.  
 
Tira, Ron and Yoel Guzansky. "Is Iran in Strategic Equilibrium?" Strategic 
Assessment 18, no. 4 (January 2016): 7-18. 
 
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. "The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Cooperation and 
Confusion." In The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives, edited by 
Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson, 109-124. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
 
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. “The Treaty on The Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” July 1, 1968. 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html. 
 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Statement of James H. Noyes, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Near Eastern, African, and South 
Asian Affairs – New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., June 6, 
July 17, 23, 24, and November 28, 1973. 
 
U.S. Congress. House. Homeland Security Committee. The Future of Iranian Terror and 
Its Threat to the U.S. Homeland. By Ilan Berman. 114 Cong., 1st sess. H. Doc. 
February 11, 2016. 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20160211/104455/HHRG-114-HM05-
Wstate-BermanI-20160211.pdf. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on Military Power of Iran 
January 2015.” https://fas.org/man/eprint/dod-iran-2014.pdf. 
 
TEMPLATE 
 
 141 
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean 
Stability." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 2-5. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23218033?ref=search-
gateway:7e26b0fa999692d52bbc431c63b47f9c. 
 
Wehrey, Frederic. "Uprisings Jolt the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry." Current History, December 
2011: 352-357. 
http://www.currenthistory.com.proxy.missouristate.edu/pdf_org_files/110_740_3
52.pdf. 
 
Yamani, Mai.  “The Bewildered Kingdom.” Project Syndicate. January 3, 2014. 
https://www.project-syndiacte.org/print/mai-yamani-asses-saudi-arabia-s-
increasingly-assertive-regional-foreign-polcy-since-the-start-of-the-arab-spring. 
 
Zarif, Mohammad Javad. “Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism." The New York Times, 
September 13, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/opinion/mohammad-
javad-zarif-let-us-rid-the-world-of-wahhabism.html. 
 
———. "Saudi Arabia's Reckless Extremism." The New York Times. January 10, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/opinion/mohammad-javad-zarif-saudi-
arabias-reckless-extremism.html.  
 
 
 
